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THE CAUSAL CONTEXT OF DISPARATE
VOTE DENIAL
JANAI S. NELSON*

Abstract: For nearly fifty years, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA") and
its amendments have remedied racial discrimination in the electoral process with unparalleled muscularity. Modern vote denial practices that have a
disparate impact on minority political participation, however, increasingly

fall outside the VRA's ambit. As judicial tolerance of disparate impact
claims has waned in other areas of law, the contours of Section 2, one of
the VRA's most powerful provisions, have also narrowed to fit the shifting
landscape. Section 2's "on account of race" standard to determine discrimination in voting has evolved from one of quasi-intent determined by
a totality of the circumstances, to a short-lived intent requirement, followed by an enhanced disparate impact analysis, culminating in a more
recent standard that simulates proximate cause. This Article proposes a
test for Section 2 vote denial claims that comports with the narrowing construction of disparate impact claims and reclaims the robust contextual
analysis that the VRA contemplates. The "causal context" test proposed
here is anchored to "core values" mined from Section 2's legislative history, particularly the "Senate factors." The causal context analysis relies on
proof of explicit or implicit bias, as well as circumstances internal and external to elections that give rise to disparate vote denial, without requiring
proof of intent. This approach is historically consistent with the VRA's totality of the circumstances test and cognizant of courts' increasing demands for proof of a causal link within disparate impact jurisprudence.
Moreover, the proposed causal context analysis is consonant with recent
federal proceedings evaluating the racially disparate impact of voter identification laws, voter purges, early voting restrictions, and other forms of
modern vote denial.
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INTRODUCTION

President Barack Obania's historic election and reelection is evidence of the increasing durability and resilience of minority voting
power. Minority voters participated in the 2008 general election in record numbers and returned to the polls in 2012 at nearly equal levels.'
It was dubious that such turnout and participation could recur in 2012
in light of the legal framework of mutually reinforcing voter identification ("voter ID") requirements, voter purges, felon disfranchisement
laws, and restrictive voting periods.2 Indeed, the 2008 election that
1The 2008 electorate was the most racially and ethnically diverse in U.S. history, with
nearly one in four votes cast by non-whites. MARK HUGO LOPEZ & PAUL TAYLOR, DIssECTING THIE 2008 1 tEC toRAIE: MosT DIvERsE IN U.S. HIStoRY 3 (2009), available at http://
pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/dissecting-2008-electorate.pdf. Moreover, the rise in minority
voter registration in 2008 narrowed the registration gap between blacks and whites from ten
percentage points in 2004 to four percentage points in 2008, and black Voter participation
nearly matched that of whites for the first time in history. Id. at i-ii, 4. Overall Voter turnout
decreased from 61.6% in 2008 to 58.2% in 2012. Michael P. McDonald, Turnout in the 2012
PresidentialElection, HuiIINo ION Post (Feb. 11, 2013, 1:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/nmichael-p-mcdonald/turnout-in-the-2012-presi b 2663122. html; see Juliet Lapidos,
Voter Turnout, N.Y. TIMis, TAKING Noi BIOG (Mar. 13, 2013, 10:02 AM), http://taking
note.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/03/13/voter-turnout/; Sean Sullivan, The States with the Highest
and Lowest Turnout in 2012, in 2 Charts, WASI. PosT, TIIE Fix (Mar. 12, 2013, at 12:36 PM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/12/the-states-with-the-highestand-lowest-turnoit-in-2012-in-2-charts/. In this most recent election, young and minority
voter turnout increased as compared to 2008, and young Voters were the most racially and
ethnically diverse segment of the voting population. NoNPROITIVo tE, AMERICAN GoEs to
tIHE POLLs 2012: A REPOR ON VoTER TURNOUT IN tHiE 2012 1 tEc IION 13 (n.d.), available
at http://www.nonprofitvote.org/voter-turnout.html. Latino voter turnout increased to
10% of the general electorate and was even higher in western states such as Nevada, where
Latino turnout was 18%. Id. at 15. Blacks maintained their 2008 voter turnout rate of 13%
of the electorate and may have voted at a higher rate than whites. Paul Taylor, The Growing
Electoral Clout of Blacks Is by Turnout, Not Demographics, PEw REs. CEN ER (Dec. 26, 2012),
http://pewsocialtrends.org/2012/12/26/the-growing-electoral-clout-of-blacks-is-driv en-byturnout-not-demographics/1 /; see NONPROFIT VOTE, supra, at 17.
2 See, e.g., KEESHA (ASKINS & SUNtEEP IvER, BRENNAN CTR. IOR justici, THI CHALtIENCE OF OBTAINING VOTER IDENtI ICATION 1 (2012), http://brennan.3cdn.net/f5f28dd
844al43d303_i36m6lyhy.pdf (assessing the difficulties that eligible Voters may face in acquiring photo identification); JON C. ROGOWSKI & CATIHY J. COHEN, BI ACK YOUTH PROJEct , TURNING BACK THE CLOCK ON VOTING RIGHtS: THE IMPACT O NEW PHOTO IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ON YOUNG PEOPLE OF COLOR 1 (2012), http://research.black
youthproject.com/files/2012/09/Youth-of-Color-and-Photo-ID-Laws.pdf (reporting that between 170,000 and 475,000 young black Voters, 68,000 and 250,000 young Latino Voters,
13,000 and 46,000 young Asian American voters, 1700 and 6400 young Native American voters, and 700 and 2700 young Pacific Islander Voters might not have been able to Vote in the
2012 general elections because they did not possess the identification required under new
state laws); WENDY R. WEISER & LAWRENCE NORDEN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTING
RIGHTS CHANCES IN 2012, at 19 (2011), http://brennan.3cdn.net/9cOa034a4b3c68a2af
9hm6bj6dO.pdf (tracking election law changes in 2011 that impacted the right to vote, in-
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brought the United States its first African American 3 head of state and
the world its first black leader of a non-majority black nation occurred
tinder markedly less restrictive voting conditions. 4
cluding voter registration and voter ID requirements). Preliminary analyses show that voter
ID laws had less of an effect on the 2012 election than was anticipated. Suevon Lee, What
Effect, If Any, Did Voter ID Laws Have on the Election, PRoPumaIcA (Nov. 15, 2012, 2:34 PM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/what-effect-if-any-did-oter-id-laws-have-on-the-election
(noting that, although voter ID laws had received the most attention, they would prove to
be a far less significant problem as compared with limited early voting hours, lengthy ballots, and precinct shutdowns because of Hurricane Sandy). Estimates show that less than
five percent of provisional ballots in Virginia were cast because of lack of valid identification. Id. Likewise, in Tennessee, where new voter ID laws were put into effect in 2012, only
674 voters filled out provisional ballots due to lack of a valid identification, and the overall
voter turnout remained consistent with past years. Id. But see Deborah Charles, Complaints
About VoterlDs, Ballots, Long Lines in Election, RETERS, Nov. 7, 2012, available at http://www.
reuters.com/article/2012/11/07/us-usa-campaign-voting-idUSBRE8A609820121107
(reporting that some Pennsylvanians were turned away at the polls for lack of valid photo ID even
though Pennsylvania voter ID laws are not in effect). True the Vote recently released a
report asserting that voter ID laws did not have any negative impact on voter turnout, and
new voter ID laws may have bolstered voter turnout due to increased voter confidence. See
generally TRUE IE VOTE, REPORT ON VOIER SUPPRESSION IN IHE LECTIONS O NOVEMBER
2012 (2013), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/127481956/Voter-Suppression-inthe-Elections-of-November-2012 (summarizing True the Vote's research and findings).
This report has been widely criticized as false and misleading. See, e.g., Paul Gronke, True
the bte Continues to Print Untrue Things, EARLY VOTING CENTER (Mar. 6, 2013), http://early
voting.net/commentary/true-the-vote-continues-to-print-untrue-things/; Rob Richie, True
the ote Presents False Findings, HuehINt ION Pos (Mar. 1, 2013, 6:41 PM), http://www/
huffingtonpost.com/rob-richie/true-the-vote-fudges-numb-b_2785093.html.
Critics of the
True the Vote report revealed that it incorrectly compared voter turnout of eligible voters in
2008 to registered voters in 2012 to support the claim that voter turnout had not decreased
in states that passed new voter ID laws. See Gronke, supra; Richie, supra. True the Vote twice
revised the report to delete the false statistical analysis on voter turnout, but did not revise
the claims concerning the effect of voter ID laws on voter turnout. See Gronke, supra; Richie,
supra. True the Vote maintains that the original conclusions in the report are correct. See Rick
Hasen, True the lote Comment on Corrected Voter Suppression Report, EEC I ION L. BLOG (Mar. 1,
2013, 10:37 AM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p 47938 (reprinting True the Vote's statement).
Although President Obama is biracial, he self-identifies as an African American. See Sam
Roberts & Peter Baker, Asked to Declare His Race for Census, Obama Checks Black,'N.Y. TIMEs,
Apr. 3, 2010, at A9 (reporting that President Obama designated himself as "Black, African
Am., or Negro" on the 2010 U.S. Census).
4 One dozen states, including eight of the eleven states in the former Confederacy,
approved new voting restrictions leading up to the 2012 election. Election 2012: Voting Laws
Roundup, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.brennancenter.org/
content/resource/2012_summaryof voting law changes [hereinafter Voting Laws Roundup].
Kansas and Alabama passed legislation requiring would-be voters to provide proof of citizenship before registering. Id. Florida and Texas imposed significant obstacles for groups
like the League of Women Voters and Rock the Vote to register new voters. Id.; see also DiANA

KAsIAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, STATE RESTRICTIONS ON VOTER REGISTRATION

DRIVES 4 (2012), http://brennan.3cdn.net/17c2fc295efl249450_26m6bt3yf.pdf (discussing laws governing voter registration drives). Maine repealed its nearly forty-year-old law
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On balance, election laws adopted since 2008 comprise a powerful, interlocking grid of modern vote denial that is disproportionately
visited upon racial minorities. 5 These restrictions run counter to election reform's general expansion of the franchise and trajectory toward
increasing electoral participation. 6 The disparate impact 7 of these laws
also runs counter to the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA"). 8 The VRA
has played a pivotal role in enhancing racial minorities' political participation and the integrity of American democracy. In the most recent
election cycle, the VRA blocked restrictive voting laws in three jurisdictions. 9 Although these laws did not alter the outcome of elections, and

permitting Election Day voter registration. WEISER & NORDEN, supra note 2, at 25. Five

states-Florida, Georgia, Ohio, Tennessee, and West Virginia-cut short their early voting
periods amid litigation. Id. Florida and Iowa reversed executive orders and disenfranchised
tens of thousands of previously eligible voters by barring all ex-felons from the polls. Id. at
3. Under the previous executive order, 87,000 Floridians would have had their voting
rights reinstated prior to the 2012 election. Id. Finally, six states-Alabama, Kansas, South
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin-required voters to show governminent-issued
ID in order to cast a standard ballot. ROGOWSKI & COHEN, Supra note 2, at 6-8, 11-12; see
also WEISER & NORDEN, supra note 2, at 2 (tracking election law changes in 2011 that impact the right to vote, including voter registration and voter ID requirements).
5 The current president and chief executive officer of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Ben Jealous, observed, "We are living through
the greatest wave of legislative assaults on voting rights in more than a century. In 2011 and
2012, more states have passed more laws pushing more voters out of the ballot box than at
any time since the rise ofJim Crow." Benjamin Todd Jealous, President & Chief Exec. Officer,
Nat'l Ass'n for the Advancement of Colored People, Keynote Address at First Plenary Session, NAACP 103d Annual Convention 5 (July 9, 2012), http://naacp.3cdn.net/eel44c
598135908d65 wwm6iyzz7.pdf; see also ROGOWSKI & COIEN, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that
immediately after President Obama took office, Republican legislatures began enacting new
voter ID laws that greatly restricted people's ability to vote).
6 See generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, TII RmIlH To VOTE: TiI CON TEsT i) HisTORY O
DEMOCRACY IN THIE UN IED StAIEs (2000) (examining the expansion of suffrage through-

out the history of the United States).
7 Disparate impact refers to "an adverse, disproportionate impact [that] is brought
about by decisionmaking criteria or practices that operate to harm individuals on the basis
of a protected status characteristic" such as race. Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscimination Law: Beyond Intent Vrsus Impact, 41 Hous. L. REv. 1469, 1473 (2005); see also BLACK 'S
LAW DICTIONARY 538 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "disparate impact" as "[t]he adverse effect
of a facially neutral practice (esp. an employment practice) that nonetheless discriminates
against persons because of their race, sex, national origin, age, or disability and that is not
justified by business necessity"). Disparate impact is discerned through evidence of statistical disparities. See Foster, supra, at 1513.
1 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-1973bb-1 (2006).
9 See South Carolina v. United States, No. 12-203, 2012 WL 4814094, at *17 (D.D.C.
Oct. 10, 2012) (blocking South Carolina's amendment to its voter ID laws for the 2012
elections, but approving it for use beginning in 2013); Texas v. Holder, No. 12-cy-128, 2012
WL 3743676, at *32 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2012) (striking down the Texas voter ID law); Florida
v. United States, No. 11-1428, 2012 WL 3538298, at *47 (D.D.C. Aug. 16, 2012) (holding
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turnout among young black and Latino voters remained comparable to
2008,10 preliminary data suggest that these laws threatened to suppress
minority voter turnout in measurable ways." Despite suggestions that
voter suppression tactics can trigger a "backlash" increase in minority
voter turnout,' 2 these tactics nonetheless violate the VRA's core principle-to ensure that the race of a voter has no bearing on his or her
ability to vote.13 Moreover, the backlash effect does not negate the increased burden placed on minorities' right to vote even if, ultimately
and intermittently, minority voters can bear it and elect candidates of
their choice.
Congress's broad mandate that the VRA provide racial minorities
"equal access to the process of electing their representatives" and that

Section 2 of the VRA serve as "the major statutory prohibition of all
voting rights discrimination" has largely been effectuated through the
persistent enforcement (and threat of enforcement) of the VRA.14 The
VRA's purpose is not only to rid the electoral arena of existing racial
discrimination, but also to insulate the electoral process from future

that a decrease in time for early voting from twelve to eight days disproportionately affected minority voters).
10 See LoPEZ & TAYLOR, supra note 1, at 3-4 (stating that minority voters made up an unprecedented share of the electorate in 2008); Election 2012: Young and Minority Voters Turn Out
in Levels Close to 2008, PAIR oI-Nrws (Nov. 7, 2012, 10:23 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/
midstate/index.ssf/2012/11/election 2012_young-and minori.html (reporting that minorityvoters made up a large portion of the electorate in both 2008 and 2012); see also RICHARD
L. HASEN, THE VOTING WARS: FROM FLORIDA 2000 TO THLNExT ELEC IION MEI oowN 81
(2012) ("Whether or not there's a lot of voter suppression, fear of it and Democratic efforts
at 'election protection' seem to ... bring out Democratic voters.").
" See Karen Tanenbaum, Voter 1D Laws and Blocking Access to the Ballot: New Tools, Old
Tricks, LEADERSHIP CONF., http://www.civilrights.org/monitor/winter-2012/voter-id-laws-andblocking.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (stating that the new voter ID laws will have an impact on minority voters' access to the polls based on a Brennan Center for Justice study);
Voting Laws Roundup, supra note 4; see also HASEN, supra note 10, at 81 (arguing that fear of
voter suppression seems to increase Democratic voter turnout).
12Ari Berman, How the GOP'sWar on Voting Backfired, THE NATION (Nov. 8, 2012, 2:24 PM),
http://www.thenation.com/blog/171146/gops-failed-voter-suppression-strategy
("We're still
waiting on the data to confirm this theory, but a backlash against voter suppression laws could
help explain why minority voter turnout increased in 2012.").
13 See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 478 (1997); Morse v. Republi-

can Party of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 193 (1996); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 880 (1994); Beer v.
United States, 425 U.S. 130, 131-33 (1976); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
308 (1966). The VRA has its basis in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONst . amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); id. amend. XV, § 1 ("The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.").
14S. REP. No. 97-417, at 30, 36 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 207, 214.
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racial discrimination. 15 This latter, prophylactic goal underscores the
VRA's continuing relevance and the breadth of its reach. However, in
the midst of palpable retrenchment in the area of voting rights, including a pending challenge to the constitutionality of Section 2's most able
counterpart, Section 5,16 the VRA has become increasingly feckless in
defending against laws that disproportionately threaten to frustrate racial minorities' right to vote. Key provisions of the VRA have come tinder assault, in part because of a misguided understanding of minority
voter turnout and a failure to recognize that unlawful minority voter
suppression tactics persist despite minority candidate success. 17
Judicial reticence to acknowledge disparate impact in voting and
other contexts compounds the weakening force of the VRA in vote de-

nial challenges.' 8 Equal protection jurisprudence's notorious anibivalence toward proof of bias (explicit or implicit) sufficient to sustain a
constitutional violation' 9 also appears to have infected analyses of the
VRA. In addition, the advent of modern vote denial measures has coincided with significant constrictions of the disparate impact standard in
15 Section 2 of the VRA forbids any "standard, practice, or procedure" that "results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006). Section 5 of the VRA requires that certain covered states and political subdivisions seek preclearance before enforcing "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting" in order to ensure that it does not have the "purpose nor
will have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color."
Id. § 1973c(a) (2006).
16 See Shelby County, Ala. v. Holder, 679 E3d 848, 884 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 81
U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96) (challenging the constitutionality of Section
5).
17 See infra notes 179-199 and accompanying text.
1I See infra notes 126-173 and accompanying text.
19 See Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 Tu . L. REv. 1065, 1069-73 (1998) (commenting that "the Court's application of the discriminatory intent requirement has been
far from coherent" and examining the disparate approaches that are currently used); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection, 41 SIAN. L. Riv. 1105, 1106-07 (1989)
(stating that the doctrine of intent actually shifts burdens of proof to allow the judging of
substantive outcomes consistent with liberal ideology); Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional
Discrimination:The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 Gro. L.J. 279, 287, 294 (1997) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court employs such a broad definition of intentional discrimination that it limits its understanding of the doctrine).
Moreover, Justice Antonin Scalia's ominous declaration, in the 2009 Supreme Court
case, Ricci v. DeStefano, that "the war between disparate impact and equal protection will be
waged sooner or later" underscores his concerns about the constitutionality of disparate
impact theory. 557 U.S. 557, 595-96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). Just one year later,
however, Justice Scalia authored a unanimous opinion in which the Court stated that its
"charge is to give effect to the [disparate impact] law Congress enacted." Lewis v. City of
Chi., 130 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2010). This ambivalence toward disparate impact theory permeates courts' treatment of disparate impact claims.
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litigation under Section 2 of the VRA, which expressly prohibits any law
or practice that denies or diminishes the right to vote on account of
race. 20 Most notably, the role of intent under Section 2 of the VRA remains a vexing question nearly fifty years after the VRA's inception and
three decades since Section 2 was amended specifically to omit an intent requirenient. 21
Challenges to Section 2's constitutionality on the one hand and
expansive constructions of its reach and remedies on the other have
confounded courts' and commentators' struggle to make sense of the
provision's application to modern vote denial. Section 2 has been rehashed and deconstructed to such a degree that the provision's plain
meaning has become obscured. Proposals concerning the interpreta-

tion of Section 2 include relaxed evidentiary standards, complex burdens of proof, and heightened scrutiny.22 Notwithstanding their individual merit, each proposal fails to reconcile the historical context that
gave rise to the VRA's passage and anchors its normative goals with the
increasingly prevalent view that non-intent-based race discrimination
cannot be remedied in the courts.23 Moreover, a recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision Ricci v. DeStefano, an employment discrimination case,
raises challenging questions concerning disparate impact evidence as a
touchstone for, but not the sole evidence of, racial discrimination. 24
Ricci's holding that evidence of statistical disparity is not "a strong
basis in evidence" to advance a claim of employment discrimination,
despite contrary language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VII"),25 potentially informs Section 2's vote denial jurisprudence. Like Title VII, Section 2 relies on evidence of statistical disparity,
among other proof, as part of its totality of the circumstances analysis.26
Ricci's Title VII standard27 and other legal developments have forced an
overdue grappling with Section 2's "on account of race" clause, upon
which every Section 2 claim hinges. This inquiry, in turn, informs the
overarching question plaguing Section 2: what, other than an intent to

infra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
21Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)).
22 See infra notes 126-173 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
24 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584.
25 See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
26 See infra notes 58-81 and accompanying text (discussing Section 2's totality of the
circumstances test).
27 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 584.
20 See
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discriminate based on race, proves that disparate vote denial is "on account of race"?
This Article responds to that question by identifying two "core values" of Section 2 that compel a deeper inquiry into what I term the
"causal context of disparate vote denial." Mined from the plain language of Section 2 and the legislative history of its amendments- specifically, the "Senate factors" -the core values of Section 2 are based on
a principle of equality that is both remedial and prophylactic. Reduced
to their simplest terms, Section 2's core values are that (1) racial context matters and (2) implicit bias counts. 28 As the Senate factors reveal,
Congress intended to neutralize the effects of past racial discrimination
in the electoral arena by requiring courts to take account of race when

evaluating electoral systems and practices. In other words, Section 2's
remedial function elevates the importance of racial context as proof of
causation. Courts must examine the historical racial context of discrimination in which contemporary race-neutral laws operate to determine whether persistent racial inequality interacts with these laws to
cause disparate vote denial. The second core value of Section 2 that the
Senate factors reveal is recognition of the complexity of racial discrinination, in all its forms, including implicit bias. 29 In considering evidence of implicit bias in addition to other direct and indirect proof of
discrimination in voting, courts must demand that disparate vote denial
be explained in terms other than race to avoid invalidation under Section 2.
These core values oblige courts to consider disparate impact and
its causes in broad terms; that is, Section 2 requires courts to take account of the "causal context" of the statistical disparities that define
disparate vote denial. Section 2's dual remedial and prophylactic aims
are best served when courts evaluate not only statistical evidence of racial impact, but also the racial context in which this evidence is situated.
In other words, the aims are best served by taking account of the causal
context, including evidence of implicit bias. The causal context analysis
is legally and historically consistent with the impact of race in the electoral process, as well as with recent studies demonstrating that consideration of implicit bias is indispensable to the modern treatment of
race.30 Contrary to the notion that vote denial claims do not square
28 See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
3 See generally, e.g., IMPLICIT BIAS ACROSS TIIE LAw (Justin D. Levinson & RobertJ. Smith
eds., 2012) (chronicling, in a series of essays, how pervasive implicit racial attitudes and stereotypes perpetuate the continued subordination of historically disadvantaged groups
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with Section 2's jurisprudence, this Article demonstrates that the Senate factors, which have defined Section 2 claims, are a template for the
causal context analysis because they rely on expansive evidence of discrimination that includes both explicit and implicit bias.31
Recent federal proceedings in Texas, Florida, South Carolina, and
New Hampshire, where Section 5 of the VRA was used to challenge
voter ID restrictions and early voting restrictions, also reinforce the
causal context analysis as the appropriate treatment for disparate vote
denial claims.3 2 In those cases, there was a broad inquiry into the election laws at issue and the racial inequality in areas external to voting to

determine the lawfulness of their impact. This Article briefly examines
these cases to guide its construction of an invigorated Section 2 analysis. 3 This Article also proposes a new framework for analyzing certain
Senate factors by drawing upon disparate impact analyses under Title
VII.34 Cut from similar cloth, both Title VII and the VRA invite a deductive evaluation of state motives without requiring proof of intentional discrimination. Issued in the wake of narrowing constructions of

through the legal system); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94
CALuI. L. Riv. 969 (2006) (investigating the possibility of using the law as a "debiasing" tool
to counter implicit bias); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. Rrv. 1489 (2005)
(applying a social cognitive model of implicit bias to Federal Communications Commission
regulations); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan I. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. Rrv. 997 (2006) (advancing
a theory of "behavioral realism" to identify discriminatory motives in Title VII disparate
treatment cases); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (evaluating the doctrine of discriminatory
purpose in light of the potential for implicit bias); Michael H. LeRoy, Do PartisanElections of
Judges Produce thiequalfustice When CourtsReview Employment Arbitrations?,95 IowA L. RiEv. 1569
(2010) (examining how judicial elections impact courts' review of arbitrator rulings in employment disputes); Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, and
the Problem of Implicit Bias, 15 MI CH. J. RACt & L. 1 (2009) (analyzing polling places as a site
for implicit bias).
31 Implicit bias theory has been summarized and defined as "discriminatory biases
based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes." Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. Riv. 945, 951 (2006). By its
very nature, implicit bias is not cognizable by its perpetrator; rather, it operates as a subterranean influence on actions and decision making. See Lawrence, supra note 30, at 322
("[A] large part of the behavior that produces racial discrimination is influenced by unconscious racial motivation." (footnote omitted)).
32 South Carolina,2012 WL 4814094, at *19; Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *32; Florida, 2012
WL 3538298, at *47; Letter from T. Christian Herren, Jr., Chief, Voting Section, Civil Rights
Di., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to J. Gerald Hebert & Stephen B. Pershing 1-2 (Sept. 4, 2012)
[hereinafter New Hampshire Preclearance Letter], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
105005436/DOJ-New-Hampshire-Voter-ID.
33See infra notes 103-125 and accompanying text.
- See infra notes 126-173 and accompanying text.
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Title VII claims, the Equal Emnploynent Opportunity Connission's
(EEOC) new guidelines for age discrimination claims illuminate the
application of certain Senate factors under the VRA. 35
Importantly, the causal context analysis does not contemplate that
all disparate impact will be eliminated from the electoral arena. For
example, if a race-neutral voting qualification has a racially disparate
impact because the qualification operates within a context of discrimination, Section 2 invalidates the practice for as long as the disparate
impact or the discriminatory context persists. 36 Once the discriminatory context is cured, a Section 2 violation can no longer be sustained.37 Section 2's constitutionality is thus reinforced, because its ability to remedy disparate vote denial is not unending or unlimited.

Moreover, although factually rigorous, the causal context test is deteriminate enough for courts to apply it consistently and for it to inform
legislatures and election officials prospectively of potential violations.
The VRA's role in challenging societal discrimination also should not
be overstated. The VRA recognizes the existence of societal discrimination but does not seek a direct remedy for it; instead, the VRA modestly
aims to ininunize the political process from its effects. That is the rub
that both preserves the constitutionality of Section 2 and makes claims
under this provision especially challenging to prove.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. First, Part I provides a broad
overview of the VRA as a disparate impact statute.38 Section A begins by
examining Section 2's core values. 39 Section B then briefly traces the
evolution of Section 2's intent standard from its broad origins, to a subsequently narrowed judicial interpretation, to expansive amendments
that place it within the legal realm of disparate impact, to its current,
circumscribed form. 40 Section C considers recent Section 5 proceedings concerning voter ID and early voting laws as examples of how the
context of discrimination is integral to the VRA inquiry.41 Finally, Section D looks to the Court's recent disparate impact jurisprudence in
the area of employment discrimination to inform a constitutionally
3 See Questions and Answers on EEOC Final Rule on Disparate Impact and "ReasonableFactors
Other Thau Age" Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OrPORlauNilY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.goVlaws/regulations/adea rfoa qa final rule.
cfn (last visited Mar. 10, 2013) [hereinafter EEOC Qyestions & Answers].
36 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
37Id.
38 See infra notes 49-173 and accompanying text.

39 See infra notes 58-81 and accompanying text.
40 See infra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.

41See infra notes 103-125 and accompanying text.
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permissible evidentiary standard in vote denial claims. 42 In particular,
this Section examines the Ricci decision and identifies parallels between
the VRA and Title VII to explain how EEOC guidelines may be used to
apply to certain Senate factors.
The Article then proceeds to Part II, which introduces the causal
context test as a workable analysis for Section 2 vote denial claims that
complements Section 2's core values. 43 Section A distinguishes existing
proposals for Section 2 analyses. 44 Section B explores the components
of the causal context test, including the role of implicit bias in Section
2, the standard of proof for evidence of discrimination external to voting that produces disparate vote denial, and the analysis of the tenuousness of the state policy.45 The Article concludes with Part III, which
briefly outlines how the causal context test would apply to modern vote
denial practices, including voter ID laws, 46 felon disenfranchisement, 47
and voter purges. 48
Importantly, this Article does not go down the inviting and equally
challenging path of defining the right to political participation or what
constitutes meaningful participation in the political process. Rather,
this Article's focus is on how Section 2 protects the right to political
participation by casting a ballot on an equal basis as other groups, regardless of race. The Article concludes that, to the extent that a voter's
race is predictive of the relative ease or difficulty he or she will face in
casting a ballot, the causal context test can reveal whether discrinination is present, and Section 2 can provide a remedy. It further establishes that, despite current constrictions, Section 2 litigation preserves a
relevant space for proof of racially disparate impact both internal and
external to the electoral process, and, consequently, helps to insulate
our democracy from racial discrimination's deleterious effects.
I. THE VRA AS A DISPARATE IMPACT STATUTE

For nearly fifty years, the VRA and its amendments have remedied
racial discrimination in the electoral process with unparalleled muscularity. The VRA revolutionized minority voters' access to the political
process and enabled diverse candidates to compete for leadership and
See infra notes
See infra notes
* See infra notes
45 See infra notes
46 See infra notes
47 See infra notes
48 See infra notes
42
4
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office-holding on scales that were unfathomable prior to its 1965 enactnent.4" The VRA's success in this regard is owed largely to its two
most frequently enforced provisions: Section 2 and Section 5.5o Section
2 of the VRA provides a remedy within the electoral arena for any voting practice, procedure, or law that has the intent or effect of denying
or abridging the right to vote on account of race.5 1 Section 5, by contrast, is limited to certain jurisdictions with a history of discrimination
in voting, and prohibits voting changes that (1) are retrogressive, that
is, that worsen the electoral position of minorities, or (2) are intended
to discriminate based on race, regardless of effect.52
Both Sections 2 and 5 employ disparate impact theory by measuring the effect of a particular election law or practice on racial iinori-

ties as compared to non-ninority groups. 5 3 Because of Section 5's lim49 SeeJUDSON L. JEFFRIES, HUEY P. NEWTON: TIIE RADICAL TIIEORIST 85 (2002) ("Prior to
1964, there were 103 black elected officials throughout the United States. That number
climbed to 1,400 with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965."). By the end of the
1970s, the total number of black elected officials nationwide had more than doubled, to
nearly 5000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STAIISIICAL AstRACT o THE UNIIED StATEs: 2011, at
258 (2011), availableat http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011 /tables/ 11s0413.pdf.
Currently, there are approximately 10,000 black elected officials nationwide. JOIN I CTR. POR
PoLIIICAL & ICON. SIunlEs, NAtIONAL REGISTER O

BLACK 1LECTED OlIculAs FAc i SHEFT

1 (2011), available at http://www.jointcenter.org/sites/default/files/upload/research/files/
National% 20Roster% 20f% 20Black% 20Elected% 200fficials% 20Fact% 20Sheet.pdf; see also
StEVEN ANDREW LIGHT, "THE LAW IS GOOD": THE VoTING RICH is Ac t, REDISTRICTINC, AND
BLACK REGIME POLITICS, at ix (2010) (noting the VRA's impact in expanding the ranks of

black, Latino, and Asian elected officials).
5o In addition, other provisions of the VRA, most notably Sections 4 and 203 (and its
accompanying provisions), have eliminated significant barriers to political participation.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006 & Supp. II 2008) (prohibiting certain devices such as literacy
tests as voting prerequisites, providing for the appointment of federal examiners and federal observers, and establishing the triggering formula for Section 5 of the VRA); Voting
Rights Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, §§ 203, 301, 89 Stat. 400 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb) (requiring translated election materials for certain
populations).
1 Id. § 1973a.
52Id. § 1973c(a).

53 See id. §§ 1973a, 1973c(a). Section 2 claims fall into either of two categories: vote
denial or vote dilution. See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New bte Denial: Where Election Reform Meets
the Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REv. 689, 691 (2006). Vote denial occurs when an individual
is prevented from casting a ballot because of a law, practice, or procedure that makes it
impossible or overly burdensome to do so. Id. Vote dilution is when a person or group of
persons is permitted to cast ballots, but the ballots are not counted equally with other
votes. Id. Vote dilution is often framed as a group right to have its votes cast and counted
equally. Id.
There are significant parallels between Sections 2 and 5 in the area of disparate impact.
For example, Section 5's retrogression standard measures the degree to which minority voting power is diminished relative to its existing power vis-a-vis whites. Rick Pildes, How Ricci
Will Affect the bting Rights Act, BALKINIZATION (June 29, 2009, 10:43 AM), http://balkin.
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ited geographic coverage and unique preclearance standard, 54 however, it is not the ideal situs for large-scale disparate vote denial challenges. 55 Instead, Section 2's nationwide reach, covering all votingrelated measures, makes it especially fitting to address modern vote denial resulting from voter ID requirements, voter purges, restricted voting periods, stringent voter registration regulations,5 6 and felon disfranchisement, among other voting rights encumbrances. 5 7

blogspot.coin/2009/06/how-ricci-will-affect-voting-rights-act.html
(noting that Section 2's
prohibition of election practices that result in denial or abridgement of the right to vote on
account of race and Section 5's retrogression standard are "a form of disparate-impact law").
54 See Tokaji, supra note 53, at 691.
55 Moreover, Section 5's constitutionality is the subject of intense scrutiny, as the Supreme Court's 2012 grant of certiorari in Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder demonstrates. See
679 F.3d 848, 884 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 1296). The Court has avoided the constitutional question in recent cases by incrementally
dispossessing Section 5 of its full breadth. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One . Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202-03 (2009) (declining to decide Section 5's constitutionality, but stating that Section 5 imposes "substantial federalism costs" and "current burdens" that "must
be justified by current needs"); see also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 24-25 (2009)
(holding that Section 5 does not require states to maximize electoral opportunities for
minority voters); Riley . Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406, 428 (2008) (resolving conflicting federal
and state statutory mandates in a Section 5 redistricting challenge in favor of the state).
For these reasons, it is imperative that Section 2 operate to the fullest extent of its constitutional capacity to remedy and prevent racial discrimination us voting on a national scale.
Indeed, how well Section 2 can address a variety of voting challenges is an important consideration in the debate about the continuing role of Section 5.
56 For example, in 2011, Florida legislators enacted H.B. 1355, an omnibus bill of election law changes that included severe restrictions and burdensome administrative requirements for voter registration, including shorter deadlines for submitting completed registration forms and stiff penalties for delay or error. See FiA. STAT. § 97.0575 (2011). As a result,
several civil rights groups ceased conducting voter registration in Florida and successfully
challenged the laws. See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 863 F. Sipp. 2d 1155,
1167 (N.D. Fla. 2012) (conditionally granting a motion to enjoin the implementation of
Florida's new voter registration requirements).
57 To date, no federal appellate court has held that Section 2 applies to felon disfranchisement, and several have expressly held that it does not. See, e.g., Simmons v. Galvin, 575
F.3d 24, 34-36 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that Section 2 does not apply to state laws that disenfranchise incarcerated felons); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 329 (2d Cir. 2006) (en
banc) (holding that Congress made no clear statement of intent to apply Section 2 to felon disenfranchisement laws); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir.
2005) (en banc) (holding that Section 2 does not apply to felon disenfranchisement laws
because a contrary holding would conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment). But see Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986) (assuming without holding that the VRA
applied to Tennessee's felon disenfranchisement laws, but holding that there was no Section 2 violation).
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A. Disparate Vote Denial and the Mechanics of Section 2
Modern vote denial is characterized by disparate impact caused by
discrimination within or outside the electoral arena that is transmitted
into the electoral arena via election laws, procedures, or practices. 5 8
Section 2 broadly states that "[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite
to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a
denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race." 59 Section 2 was not always this expansive, however. In 1982, Congress amended Section 2 to address vote dilution
claims by including the terms "results" and "on account of race" to
make clear that the provision did not require a showing of intentional
racial discrimination or discriminatory purpose.60 Instead, plaintiffs
pursuing a claim under Section 2 could prevail by showing discririnatory effect. 61 Importantly, Congress was not focused on vote denial at
the time of the 1982 amendments, nor was the Supreme Court in the
1986 case, Thornlnrg v. Gingles, which was the first case to apply the
amended standard.6 2 For this reason, the legislative history of the
amendments and the seminal cases that followed do not provide much
guidance on what the test for vote denial should be. 63 They do, however, reveal certain principles that guide the vote denial analysis.

58 See Tokaji, supra note 53, at 691 (describing the set of regulations, rules, and practices governing the administration of elections that result in the disproportionate denial of
minority voters' votes as new vote denial).
59 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
so See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973). In 1980, in City of Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden, a plurality of the
Supreme Court held that Section 2 required a showing of intentional discrimination to invalidate an at-large election scheme. 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980). The plaintiffs had alleged that
Mobile, Alabama's at-large election of its commissioners effectively disabled black voters from
electing their preferred candidates because blacks were a numerical minority voting in a
climate of entrenched racial polarization. Id. at 58. The 1982 amendments to Section 2 restored the evidentiary standard established in earlier cases that considered the totality of the
circumstances and did not require direct evidence of discriminatory intent. See S. Rip. No.
97-417, at 27-28 (1982), repTinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205. Indeed, the results test that
was added to Section 2 in 1982 was borne out of a direct response to Bolden. Id.
61 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). As a result of amended Section 2, plaintiffs need only show
"that the challenged system or practice, in the context of all the circumstances in the jurisdiction in question, results in minorities being denied equal access to the political process." S. Rip. No. 97-417, at 27. This is expressly distinct from proof that the purpose of the
system or practice is to discriminate.
62 See 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
63 SeeJohnson . De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1022 (1994); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 80.
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In Gingles, the Supreme Court clarified that the "essence of a § 2
claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with
social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives." 64 The Gingles Court adopted principles developed by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in the 1973 case, Zimmer v. McKeithen, a Section 2 case, to formulate its preconditions and totality of the
circumstances analysis for Section 2 claims. 65 What emerged was a
multi-pronged test for Section 2 claims based on a theory of vote diltition-that is, based on whether an electoral practice resulted in minority voters having less opportunity to elect a candidate of their choice on
account of their race. 66 The Senate Report accompanying the 1982
amendments to the VRA also relied on Zimmer and a Supreme Court
vote dilution case from 1973, White v. Regester; to identify a wide-ranging
list of non-exhaustive factors that can reveal the racial impact of electoral laws under Section 2.67 The following seven "Senate factors" are
typical indicia of voting practices that deny minority voters an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the
state or political subdivision that touched the right of the
members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or
political subdivision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has
used unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting
practices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity
for discrimination against the minority group;

64 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47; see alboJohnson, 512 U.S. at 1022 (holding that Section 2 was
not violated where, in spite of racial discrimination, minority voters were able to form voting majorities in several districts roughly proportional to the minority's distribution in the
voting-age population).
65 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 36 n.4 (citing Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.
1973) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. E. Carroll Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976)
(per curiam)).
66 See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
67 See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 21-23 & nn.73-76, 79-81 (1982) (citing White . Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 766-69 (1973); Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
198-200.
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4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the nenmbers of the minority group have been denied access to that
process;
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the
state or political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health,
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by
overt or subtle racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have
been elected to public office in the jurisdiction. 68

The Senate Report identified two additional factors that are relevant
proof in certain cases:
A. whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the
part of elected officials to the particularized needs of the
members of the minority group.
B. whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. 69
The Senate Report makes clear, and the Supreme Court has affirmed,
that "there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be
proved or that a majority of them point one way or the other."70 The
Report further states that the "ultiniate test" for racial discrimination
under Section 2 is "whether, in the particular situation, the practice operated to deny the minority plaintiff an equal opportunity to partici71
pate and to elect candidates of their choice." Along with certain pre-

61Id. at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
69 Id. at 29 (footnote omitted) ("A" and "B" indications added). These two factors are
referred to interchangeably as factors A and B or factors 8 and 9.
7oId. at 29 & n.118 (stating that the factors were not intended "to be used [] as a mechanical 'point counting' device").

71Id. at 30. A violation of Section 2 is established "if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the
State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation" by members of a protected class, "in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice." 42
U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006).
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requisites established in Gingles, 72 these Senate factors have become the
standard mechanisi for evaluating Section 2 vote dilution claims.7"
Although Gingles did not purport to pronounce a broad rule for all
Section 2 cases, its legal framework has come to characterize Section 2
more broadly, despite the framework's ill-fitted application to vote denial. 74 As a result, the legal contours of vote denial claims remain woefully underdeveloped as compared to vote dilution claims. 75 The developient gap between Section 2's vote denial and vote dilution jurisprudence can be narrowed, however, if Section 2 is recognized as a
disparate impact provision and the unique characteristics of modern
vote denial are incorporated into the Section 2 analysis. The Gingles prerequisites, for example, have no bearing procedurally or substantively

on disparate vote denial claims. As a procedural matter, the Gingles preconditions have no place in the vote denial analysis because there are no
relevant preconditions to individual vote denial other than voting eligibility, or to disparate vote denial other than eligibility and statistical dis-

72 Gingles involved a challenge by black voters to North Carolina's state legislative redistricting plan following the 1990 U.S. Census. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 34-35. In considering the
plaintiffs' claims, the Gingles Court established a tripartite threshold examination of vote
dilution claims under Section 2 of the VRA. Id. at 50-51. Groups alleging a violation must
establish that they are: (1) sufficiently large and geographically compact; (2) politically cohesive; and (3) routinely denied an equal opportunity to elect candidates of their choice because of racially polarized voting patterns. Id. If these "preconditions" are met, then the court
must consider the challenged practice under the "totality of circumstances." Id. at 43, 50, 7980.
73 See Ellen Katz et al., Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Since 1982: Final Report of the voting Rights Initiative, University of
Michigan Law School, 39 U. MICH. .JL.
RiORM 643, 675 (2006).
74One scholar has noted the Gingles framework's inefficacy at addressing Section 2
claims that do not involve redistricting and reapportionment. See Tokaji, supra note 53, at
709, 721. Vote denial claims (and some vote dilution claims) still lack a standardized litigation framework. As of 2005, less than a quarter of Section 2 cases addressed vote denial
claims. See id. at 708-09. Since then, the numbers have not increased significantly. In 2006,
the University of Michigan Law School's Voting Rights Initiative issued a comprehensive
survey of lawsuits raising Section 2 claims for which rulings were available. See Katz et al.,
supra note 73, at 654. The report cited 321 lawsuits in total, of which more than two-thirds
involved vote dilution claims such as challenges to at-large districts, redistricting plans, and
majority vote requirements. Id. at 654-57. A remaining sexventy-two cases involved challenges to election procedures or other practices (such as felon disfranchisement, voter
registration regulations, ballot requirements, appointments, and annexations) that may be
characterized as vote denial. Id.; see also Tokaji, supra note 53, at 709 ("While some may
disagree as to how to categorize some cases, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of
Section 2 lawsuits since 1982 have involved claims of vote dilution and not vote denial.").
7 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 709 ("While Gingles and its progeny have generated a wellestablished standard for vote dilution, a satisfactory test for vote denial cases under Section
2 has yet to emerge.").
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parities. 76 As a substantive matter, of the Gingles prerequisites, only racially polarized voting is potentially relevant to establishing the causal
context, but only as part of the totality of the circumstances and not as a
precondition to asserting a Section 2 claim.77 Although not wholly applicable to disparate vote denial,78 the Gingles test nonetheless provides
important tools for litigating and conceptualizing such claims. Racially
polarized voting and the other Senate factors illuminate the context in
which specific electoral laws operate, and, more importantly, the degree
to which race defines that context.
The Senate factors are not, of course, limited to examining the
electoral sphere. The fifth Senate factor, "the extent to which members
of the minority group ...

bear the effects of discrimination in such ar-

eas as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process," looks beyond the confines of elections and is particularly instructive to vote denial cases. 79
Indeed, in Gingles, the Supreme Court underscored the importance of
the fifth factor, stating that the "essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain
electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and
white voters to elect their preferred representatives."80 In proving Senate factor five, "Section 2 plaintiffs are not required to demonstrate intentional discrimination, much less intentional discrimination on the
part of state actors, to make out a claim."81 Although the other Senate
factors are arguably less relevant as direct evidence of vote denial, they
are nonetheless relevant to understanding the impact of vote denial. In
See supra note 74.
Crayton, Sword, Shield, and Compass: The Uses and Misuses of Racially Polar
ized bting Studies in bting Rights Enforcement, 64 RUTRS L. Riv. 973, 985 (2012) ("From its
early constitutional interpretations of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court has recognized that confronting polarized voting behavior is a key to promoting equality in the political sphere.").
7 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 721 ("The size of minority populations, their geographical
compactness, and racial bloc voting are irrelevant to measuring the impact of such practices on minority participation. It is therefore quite appropriate that lower courts have
mostly disregarded these factors in Section 2 vote denial cases.").
79 Id. at 724; see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
80 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (emphasis added).
81 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 724. At least one court has suggested that, other than factor
five, the Senate factors are misplaced in the disparate vote denial context. See Farrakhan v.
Gregoire (FarrakhanIV), 590 E3d 989, 999, 1005 (9th Cir.) (concluding that the district
court erred in giving weight to the plaintiff's failure to produce evidence of Senate factor
seven and Senate factor eight, because both factors are irrelevant to vote denial claims),
aff'd in part, overruled in part en banc, 623 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010) (FarrakhanV); see also
supra note 68 and accompanying text (listing the factors).
76

7 See Kareem U.
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other words, if vote denial occurs when none of the other Senate factors are present, it may still be cognizable on the strength of the fifth
Senate factor-the inequality external to the electoral system that is
transmitted into the electoral arena via election laws. If the other Senate factors are also present, they underscore the impact of the vote denial on the ability of minority voters to elect candidates of their choice
by establishing the context in which the vote denial operates.
B. The Role ofIntent, Disparate Inpact, and Core Values in Section 2
Read together, the Senate factors reveal Congress's intent to evaluate behavior within and outside the electoral context-without necessarily ascribing intent to that behavior-in order to determine whether
racial inequality exists in the electoral sphere.8 2 The Senate factors also
reveal certain ideals that are based on a principle of equality that is
both remedial and prophylactic in nature. Until now, however, the Senate factors have been overlooked for what they reveal about Section 2's
core values.83
The first core value that the Senate factors reveal is that racial context matters in pursuing the neutralization of the effects of past racial
discrimination in the electoral arena. This value is furthered by taking
account of race within and outside the electoral arena when evaluating
electoral systems and practices. 84 In other words, Section 2's remedial
function elevates the importance of racial context as proof of causation.
The goal of neutrality in the electoral sphere requires courts to examine the historical racial context of discrimination in which conteniporary, race-neutral laws operate to determine whether persistent racial
inequality interacts with these laws to cause disparate vote denial. The
82 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
83 Senator Orrin Hatch, who presided over the Senate proceedings, was a staunch crit-

ic of Section 2's amendments, stating that "[t] here is no core value under the results test
other than election results. There is no core value that can lead anywhere other than toward proportional representation by race and ethnic group." See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 96
(1982), repuinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269. He further argued that the totality of the
circumstances standard that the results test compelled, including reliance on the Senate
factors, guided courts only as to "the scope of the evidence," but not the "standardof evidence." Id. That is, the VRA does not guide courts as to "the test or criteria by which such
evidence is assessed and evaluated." Id.; see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 85 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that "the Court has disregarded the balance struck by Congress in
amending § 2 and has failed to apply the results test as described by this Court in Whitcomb
and White"); id. at 92-93 (stating that the Court's opinion "require[s] no reference to most
of the [Senate factors]" and enumerating the factors that may now be unnecessary).
84 See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29 (identifying as a relevant factor what is now Senate factor five).
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second core value that the Senate factors reveal is recognition of the
complexity of racial discrimination, in all its forms, including implicit
bias.85 In considering evidence of implicit bias in addition to other
proof of discrimination in voting, courts adjudicating Section 2 claims
must determine that the disparate vote denial can be explained in
terms other than race to deny a Section 2 challenge.86
In addition to its core values, Section 2 is defined, in part, by what
it is not. Section 2 is not a mandate for proportional representation;
indeed, it expressly says as much. 87 Section 2 also does not demand
proof of intentional discrimination, which the aiendments and their
underlying proceedings make clear.88 Despite Congress's categorical
rejection of an intent standard in Section 2 claims, however, the role of

intent in Section 2 jurisprudence remains perpetually fraught. Recent
voter ID, voting equipment, and felon disfranchisement cases evidence
a perplexing ambiguity among courts as to whether and to what extent
intent is required in vote denial claims. 89 The results test under Section
2, as well as the retrogression standard in Section 5, however, hinge up-

86

One of the earliest accounts of implicit bias in legal scholarship describes the coinplexity and universality of racial discrimination as it relates to implicit bias as follows:
Racism is in large part a product of the unconscious. It is a set of beliefs
whereby we irrationally attach significance to something called race.... It is a
part of our common historical experience and, therefore, a part of our culture. It arises from the assumptions we have learned to make about the world,
ourselves, and others as well as from the patterns of our fundamental social
activities.
Lawrence, supra note 30, at 330.
86 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 63 (plurality opinion).
87 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006) ("[N]othing in this section establishes a right to have
members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population.").
88 See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973); see also Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (noting
that "Congress made clear that a violation of § 2 could be established by proof of discriminatory results alone"); Old Person x. Brown, 312 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002) (asserting
that "Congress amended section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to eliminate any intent requirement with respect to vote-dilution claims"); Ruiz v. City of Santa Maria, 160 F.3d 543,
557 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting Congress's statement that the "intent test ... placed an inordinately difficult burden of proof on plaintiffs, and ... asked the wrong question" (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Frank R. Parker, The "Results" Test of Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act: Abandoning the Intent Standard,69 VA. L. REv. 715, 716 (1983) (examining
what is required to prove a violation under the Section 2 results standard).
8 See supra note 9 (collecting cases); infra notes 264-312 and accompanying text.
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on the impact of-and not necessarily the intent behind-the challenged voting practice. 90
Section 2's link to disparate impact arises from the fact that proving a Section 2 violation does not require a showing of discriminatory
intent, but only discriminatory results. 91 As a practical matter, evidence
of disparate impact in Section 2 cases serves the dual function of (1)
affirming the existence of actual vote denial and (2) quantifying the
racial effect. Tallying or estimating the raw numbers of persons whose
right to vote is or will be adversely affected can quantify the denial or
abridgment that results from a particular law or practice. The disparate
impact-that is, the disproportionate percentage of racial minorities
whose right to vote is abridged or denied vis-;1-vis whites-is evidence

that the practice's results are on account of race.
The accepted rubric of "totality of the circumstances" tests considers a host of factors, but neither the existence nor nonexistence of a
single factor is dispositive. 92 Moreover, the Senate factors are constructed to require affirmative findings: the presence of one or more
factors may provide evidence of a violation, but the absence of these
factors does not mean that no violation exists. 93 In theory, the sheer
weight of a single factor could itself be dispositive. Following the 1982
amendments, courts were unclear with respect to whether proof of disparate impact is ever enough by itself to satisfy the results test; in other
words, whether statistical evidence of disparate impact alone could be
actionable. 94 Federal courts have resoundingly held, however, that "a
bare statistical showing of disproportionate impact on a racial minority
does not satisfy the § 2 results inquiry."95 Rather, proof of a "causal
90 The most recent evidence of this in the Section 5 context is the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia's refusal to issue a declaratory judgment that Texas's newly
enacted voter ID law "'neither has the purpose nor will have the effect of denying or
abridging the right to vote on account of race[,] color," or "member [ship] [in] a language
minority group."' Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *3 (alterations in original) (quoting 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973b(f) (2), 1973c(a) (2006 & Supp. 112008).
91See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
92 See S. Rip. No. 97-417, at 33-34 (1982) (noting that Congress did not intend to require that Section 2 plaintiffs prove a majority or any other particular number of factors to
make out a case), rpinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 211-12.
' See id.
94 See Smith . Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 F.3d 586, 595
(9th Cir. 1997) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Ortiz v. City of
Phila. Office of the City Comm'rs Voter Registration Di., 28 F.3d 306, 312 (3d Cir. 1994)).
95 Id. (citing cases); see also Farrakhan v. Washington (FarrakhanIII), 359 E3d 1116,
1118 (9th Cir. 2004) (KozinskiJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Smith, 109 F.3d at 595) (arguing that the Section 2 results inquiry was
not satisfied by a statistical showing of disproportionate impact).
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connection between the challenged electoral practice and the alleged
discrimination" is required. 96 In short, there must be some evidence
that the challenged voting qualification causes the disparity.
This limitation on the evidentiary power of statistical disparities
marked a significant doctrinal development in Section 2 jurisprudence.
The previously unscripted weighing of factors identified either in the
Senate Report, or independently by the trier of fact as part of the totality of the circumstances test, now has at least one clear evidentiary linmitation. In effect, evidence of disparate impact is now muddled with the
other Senate factors, and no matter how compelling the statistical
proof of disparate impact, a Section 2 claim cannot succeed without
more. 97 This baseline understanding of the evidentiary limitations of

disparate impact does little to enlighten the broader inquiry of the role
of disparate impact in general.
There are clues, however, as to what a viable Section 2 test could
entail. As one scholar has noted, the Senate Report "did not qualify the
type of discrimination a court should consider under the test-for exaniple, a court is not limited to considering 'intentional discrimination'
or 'official discrimination' -even though the intent/impact distinction
and the public/private distinction were both firmly established components of constitutional law by 198 2 ."98 Likewise, plaintiffs can establish
Senate factor five, which asks whether an electoral practice "interacts
with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives," and which the Supreme Court has described as the "essence
of a § 2 claim," without proof of intentional discrimination.9 9 Indeed,
the 1982 amendments did not change how intent may be proved, including the fact that both direct and circumstantial evidence can estab-

96 Ortiz, 28 E3d at 310; see also Sw. Voter Registration Educ. Project. Shelley, 344 F.3d
914, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) ("To establish a Section 2 violation, plaintiffs need only
demonstrate 'a causal connection between the challenged voting practice and [a] prohibited discriminatory result."' (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 109 F.3d at 595) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The causal context test proposed by this Article differs
from causal connection in that the latter has been interpreted to simulate proximate
cause, whereas the former reinvigorates the totality of the circumstances test by taking
account of the full context in which disparate vote denial operates. See infra notes 225-235
and accompanying text.
9 See Smith, 109 E3d at 595; cf McCleskey .. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 298 (1987) (rejecting
an Equal Protection challenge based on compelling statistical evidence of racial disparity
in the application of the death penalty due to a lack of evidence of discriminatory intent).
98 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 724.
9 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47 (majority opinion).

2013]

The Causal Context ofDisparate Vote Denial: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act

601

lish intent under Section 2.100 Rather, the anendnients were designed
to address instances of discrimination even when there is no evidence of
intentional discrimination. To be sure, although "[a]n impact-based test
may serve as a prophylactic against intentional discrimination that
might otherwise seep into the voting process undetected," 101 the test
may also serve solely to address voting practices with no link whatsoever
to intentional discrimination in the electoral arena. This distinction underscores that the results test must be distinct from circumstantial evidence of intent, which was already cognizable prior to the 1982
aiendients. 102
C. Section 5 and DisparateVote Denial
Recent federal proceedings challenging voter ID laws in Texas,
New Hampshire, South Carolina, and Virginia, as well as a proceeding
in Florida opposing a shorter early voting period, reveal a disparate impact analysis that is consistent with the causal context analysis introduced here. 103 Although Section 5's coverage and scope differ from

100 See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 27 n.108 (1982) ("[D]irect or indirect circumstantial evidence, including the normal inferences to be drawn from the foreseeability of defendant's
actions . . . 'is one type of quite relevant evidence of racially discriminatory purpose.'
(quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. . Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 536 n.9 (1979))), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205. Although the amended act did not include an intent standard
for Section 2 cases, it did not prevent plaintiffs from successfully proving intent through
circumstantial evidence of discrimination. See, e.g., Major . Treen, 574 E. Supp. 325, 355
(E.D. La. 1983) (finding circumstantial evidence of intent to discriminate in the exclusion
of blacks from the Louisiana House and Senate Joint Congressional Reapportionment
Committee and from a private meeting of legislators and other interested parties where
the final redistricting decisions were made).
101 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 720.

See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74.
See supra note 32 (collecting cases). Voter ID laws from Mississippi and Alabama are
also pending preclearance from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). See, e.g., Miss.
ConE ANN. § 23-15-563 (2013). If precleared, Alabama's requirement for all voters to present a photo ID will not take effect until 2014. See ALA. CODE § 17-9-30 (Supp. 2011). The
DOJ has already rejected voter ID laws in South Carolina and Texas. See Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to H. Christopher Bartolomucci, Bancroft PLLC 2 (June 29, 2012), availableat http://www.slideshare.net/ander
sonatlarge/justice-department-letter-to-south-carolina-denying-preclearance-of-voter-id-law;
Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Keith Ingrain, Dir. of Elections, Elections Div., Office of the Tex. Sec'y of State 2 (Mar. 12, 2012)
[hereinafter Texas Objection Letter], available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/85051426/
DOJ-Letter-To-Texas-On-Voter-ID-Law; Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to C. Havird Jones, Jr., S.C. Assistant Deputy Attorney Gen.
(Dec. 23, 2011) [hereinafter South Carolina Objection Letter I], available at http://www.
justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec 5/ltr/1_122311.php.
102
103
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Section 2's,104 Section 5's application to modern voting practices that
have a disparate impact on minority voter participation is nonetheless
instructive. Both the U.S. District Court for the District of Cohumbia
(the "DCDC") and the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) have evaluated the impact of certain voter ID and early voting laws on minority
voter participation pursuant to Section 5's preclearance standard.105 As
noted above, unlike Section 2, Section 5 does not prohibit all election
laws that have a discriminatory effect on account of race.106 Rather, a
Section 5 violation results from laws that would place minority voters in
a worse position than the status quo, or that were enacted with the intent to discriminate.107
In evaluating voter ID laws, the DOJ and the DCDC investigated
whether these laws would retard minority voter turnout in upcoming
elections, resulting in the retrogression that Section 5 prohibits. The
results were mixed. The DOJ precleared Virginia's voter ID laws, which
expand the forms of identification voters can present at the polls, do
not require photo identification, and require the State to mail a voter
card to all registered voters prior to the general election.108 Similarly,
New Hampshire's voter ID laws were precleared.109 New Hampshire's
voter ID laws require photo identification, but permit voters to execute
a "challenged voter affidavit," which entitles the voter to cast a regular
ballot upon affirming his or her identity, ability to vote, and domicile in
the applicable town or ward.11 0 These measures eliminate the burden

104 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1973a (2006) (describing procedures for proceedings to enforce
the right to vote under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments), with 42 U.S.C. § 1973c
(describing preclearance requirements for changes to voting qualifications or procedures).
105See South Carolina, 2012 WL 4814094, at *17; Texas Objection Letter, supra note 103,
at 2.
106 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
107 Id.

10s See VA. Con: ANN. § 24.2-643(B) (2012); Letter from I. Christian Herren, Jr., Chief,
Voting Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Joshua N. Lief 3 (Aug. 20, 2012),
available at http://www.ag.virginia.gov/Media%20and%2ONews%20Releases/News Releases/
Cuccinelli/USDOJ_82012_Ltr-PreclearingVA Voter IDLaw.pdf. Virginia's new voter ID law
discontinues the State's practice of allowing voters to sign an affidavit to attest to their identity
in lieu of providing the statutorily required identification. See id.
109New Hampshire Preclearance Letter, supra note 32, at 2.
110N.H. Rrv. SIA. ANN. § 659:13 (2012) (effective Sept. 1, 2013). Avoter may execute
a "challenged voter affidavit" without notarization or excuse. Id. After September 1, 2013,
voters wishing to execute a "challenged affidavit ballot" will be photographed at the polling site, barring religious objection. Id.
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on voters to obtain the necessary documentation to vote-a burden
that falls disproportionately on minority voters. 1 I
By contrast, South Carolina's proposed voter ID law requires governiment-issued photo identification at the polls for a voter to cast a
non-provisional ballot, and does not provide for meaningful alternatives to photo identification. 112 The DOJ denied preclearance on the
ground that the law discriminated against black voters because they are
twenty percent more likely than white voters to lack a driver's license or
state photo identification card. 113 In response, South Carolina brought
a federal lawsuit seeking preclearance.11 4 In 2012, in South Carolina v.
United States, the DCDC precleared South Carolina's voter ID law because the state expanded the number of permissible identifications-

many of which are free and do not require a photo-and, for those
lacking any form of identification, the state permitted the use of voter
affidavits." 5 The court, however, enjoined implementation of the new
voter ID law in 2012, stating that voters and voting officials need to be
educated on the new law before it is implemented in order to avoid a
disparate impact on minorities. 116
Similarly, in the 2012 case, Texas v. Holde,; the DCDC denied preclearance of Texas's voting law on the grounds not only that the state
failed to prove that its law would not have a retrogressive effect on minority voters, but also that the evidence showed that the law would affirmatively disenfranchise minorities and the poor.17 The court rejected
the argument that, because factors other than race, such as poverty or

I

See NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EnuC. FUND., INC. & NAACP, DEFENDING DEMOCRACY:
VOTING IN Ami:RICA 32-36 (2011) [hereinafter NAACP,
DEFENDING DEMOCiAcY], http://naacp.3cdn.net/67065c25be9ae43367_inlbrsy48b.pdf (deCONFRON I ING MODERN BARRIFRS TO

scribing voter suppression tactics allegedly intended to combat increasing minority participation in the electoral process). See generally GASKINS & IYER, supra note 2 (examining voter ID
laws); ROGOWSKI & COIIEN, supra note 2 (evaluating the potential effects of photo identification requirements on young minority voters).
112See S.C. Con: ANN. § 7-13-710 (2011).

113 See South Carolina Objection Letter I, supra note 103 (finding that "[n]on-white
voters were therefore disproportionately represented, to a significant degree, in the group
of registered voters who, under the proposed law, would be rendered ineligible to go to
the polls and participate in the election"). In addition, the DOJ found "particularly persuasive" evidence that the laws were enacted with the intent to discriminate. Id.
114 See South Carolina, 2012 WL 4814094, at *19.
115 Id.

116Id. at *17 (preclearing South Carolina's voter ID law for the 2013 election to allow
time to educate voters, voting officials, and polling place attendants).
117 2012 WL 3743676, at *33. Texas filed suit in federal district court to seek preclearance of its voter ID law while it awaited preclearance from the DOJ, which was ultimately
denied. See id. at *1; Texas Objection Letter, supra note 103, at 2.
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lack of vehicular access, may proximately cause the disenfranchisement,
the law did not disenfranchise on account of race. 1 8 The court stated,
"Never has a court excused 'retrogression in the position of racial minorities' because that retrogression was proximately caused by something other than race."119
Florida's law restricting early voting was also struck down under
Section 5 by the DCDC in the 2012 case, Florida v. United States.120 The
court held that the early voting law disproportionately affected minority voters and had a retrogressive effect.121 The court accepted evidence
that black voters use early voting more than white voters, 122 and concluded that "Florida is left with nothing to rebut either the testimony of
. . . witnesses or the common-sense judgment that a dramatic reduction
in the form of voting that is disproportionately used by AfricanAmericans would make it materially more difficult for some minority
voters to cast a ballot."123
The proceedings preclearing voter ID laws, as well as those denying
preclearance to voter ID and early voting laws, reveal that, in determining whether such laws pose a retrogressive harm to minority voters, the
relevant inquiry includes an analysis of factors external to voting and
the nature of the burden the laws impose. These factors may intersect
with race-neutral voting laws to produce a disparate impact. For example, the context of inequality in Texas would cause voter ID laws disproportionately to burden the right of minorities to vote in the state.124 No
evidence of intent or purpose was required. Indeed, "[i]nterpreting
'purpose' and 'effect' as synonymous would run afoul of th[e] principle" that all words used by Congress must be given effect.125 The same
118 Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *33.

119 Id. at *32 (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 141).
120 2012 WL 3538298, at *47.
121 Id. In 2011 Florida cut its early voting period from 14 days to 8 days despite the
popularity of early voting and a lack of evidence of fraud. Michael C. Herron & Daniel A.
Smith, Florida's 2012 General Election Under HB 1355: Early Voting, Provisional Ballots,
and Absentee Ballots 2 (n.d.), available at http://electionsmith.files.wordpress.con/2013/
01/lwy-pr-herron-smith.pdf. As a result, less than 2.44 million early votes were cast in 2012,
compared to 2.66 million in 2008. Id. Additionally, the shortened early voting period disproportionately affected blacks, who comprised more than 22% of early voters despite only
representing 12.5% of the population. Id. at 2-3. The reduction in early voting in Florida
contributed to a decrease in early voting from 32% of all votes cast in 2008 to 29% in 2012.
NONPROII VoTE, supra note 1, at 12.
122 Id. at *17 (accepting an expert witness's opinion that this disparity in early voting
was especially pronounced in 2004 and 2008).
123Id. at *26.
124 Texas, 2012 WL 3743676, at *31.
125 Id.
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logic should hold for practices that result in denial or abridgement of
the right to vote on account of race in violation of Section 2.
D. The EvolvingDisparate hnpact Standard Beyond Voting
The years following the 1982 amendments to the VRA coincided
with a precipitous decline in the Supreme Court's receptivity toward
evidence of disparate impact. Most notably, in 1987, in McCleskey v.
Kemp, the Court held that a litigant alleging an equal protection violation has the "burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination" and that "the purposeful discrimination had a discriminatory effect" on him or her.126 This was hardly the first time the Court demanded evidence of intent.127 In 1976, in Washington v. Davis, the
Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause only reaches facially neutral statutes if there is evidence of intentional discrimination.128 In other words, a plaintiff challenging a facially neutral statute
must prove both discriminatory effect and the intent to discriminate.129
Discriminatory intent requires a showing that racial animus motivated the state action in question "at least in part because of . .. its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." 3 0 The plaintiff does not
need to show that the state acted solely because of the discriminatory
purpose, only that it was part of the iotivation.131 As noted above,

126 481 U.S. at 292 (internal quotation marks omitted).
127 See Washington . Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
128 Id. ("A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of race." (citation omitted)).
129 See, e.g., Bradley v. United States, 299 F.3d 197, 205 (3d Cir. 2002) ("To make an
equal protection claim in the profiling context, [the plaintiff] was required to prove that
the actions of customs officials (1) had a discriminatory effect and (2) were motivated by a
discriminatory purpose."); Chavez . Ill. State Police, 251 E3d 612, 635-36 (7th Cir. 2001)
("To show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, plaintiffs must prove that the defendants' actions had a discriminatory effect and were motivated by a discriminatory purpose."); Christman . Kick, 342 E. Supp. 2d 82, 92 (D. Conn. 2004) ("[T]o establish a violation of equal protection based on selective enforcement, the plaintiff must ordinarily show
(1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2)
that such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations, such as race."
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Flowers v. Fiore, 239 F. Supp. 2d 173, 178 (D.R.I.
2003) ("In order to prevail on this claim, [the plaintiff] must present evidence that he was
treated differently from similarly situated white motorists and that the action taken against
him was motivated, at least in part, by his race.").
130 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 298 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Christman, 342
F. Supp. 2d at 93-94 ("Disparate treatment by itself, not resulting from an impermissible
consideration or malicious or bad faith intent to injure, is an insufficient basis for an equal
protection claim.").
131Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. De. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
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McClekey further constricts the equal protection claim by imposing a
requirement of individual harn. 132 A plaintiff must show that "the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory purpose."1 3 In this
way, the McCleskey Court introduced a requirement of causation under
the Equal Protection Clause whereby a litigant must prove not only systenric discrimination, but also that discrimination occurred in his or
her particular case.134 Once the plaintiff succeeds in meeting this burden, the state may still rebut the prima facie case with a showing, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the state would have taken the
same action absent the discriminatory purpose.135
These cases anchored the principle in the Court's equal protection
jurisprudence that disparate impact or discriminatory effect alone cannot sustain a constitutional violation.136 Instead, plaintiffs seeking to
prove discriminatory effect must show "that they are members of a protected class, that they are otherwise similarly situated to members of the
unprotected class, and that plaintiffs were treated differently from
members of the unprotected class."' 3 7 It is nearly impossible not to consider the impact of these intensified limitations on disparate impact
claims in the context of the VRA.1i8 Most significantly, recent developSee McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292.
133 Id. The McCleskey decision is not without its detractors. See Samuel R. Gross &
Katherine Y Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug Interdiction on the Highway, 101
Micii. L. REv. 651, 723 (2002) ("McCleskey has been widely criticized, and rightly so. As
Justice Brennan points out in dissent, there was no real doubt that race did influence capital sentencing in Georgia; everybody who dealt with the issue in practice knew it and acted
on that knowledge. The Court denies the obvious." (footnotes omitted)).
134 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 293.
132

135 Id. at 297.

136 See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. . Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-74 (1979) (holding that
disparate impact, even when the effects are predictable, is not an equal protection violation
absent intent); Davis, 426 U.S. at 239 (noting that "our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact"); see
also United States . Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (stating that the "requirements for
a selecti-ve-prosecution claim draw on ordinary equal protection standards" and that "[t]he
claimant must demonstrate that the federal prosecutorial policy had a discriminatory effect
and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose" (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
137 Chavez, 251 F.3d. at 636.
138 See Pildes, supra note 53 ("Although not framed in precisely this language, dispa-

rate-impact analysis plays a key role throughout all aspects of the VRA, and thus [the Supreme Court's 2009 Title VII disparate impact decision in Ricci] has direct implications for
the VRA-some obvious, some more speculative."); see alsoJames McConnell & Lucienne
Pierre, Reverse Discrimination,Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, DisparateImpact, Civil Rights
Act of 1964, LEAL INFo. INS T., http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/07-1428 (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) ("Employers who must comply with anti-discrimination statutes in rela-
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ments in employment discrimination law indicate a narrowing standard
for statute-based disparate impact claims, even when Congress's enforcement powers buttress the statutes. 139 For those who have tracked
Justice Anthony Kennedy's opinions doubting the Equal Protection
Clause's congruence with the VRA,140 this development is of little stirprise. Nonetheless, the extent to which Ricci v. DeStefano has limited Title VII's capacity to redress disparate impact discrimination and what, if
any, applicability the decision holds beyond the employment discrinination context is still an open question. When considered in the context of ever-constricting voting rights claims and within the larger context of the Court's posture toward disparate impact claims, it is impossible not to draw parallels to the VRA.141

1. Ricd v. DeStefano and the VRA
In Ricci, a majority of the Supreme Court positioned Title VII's
disparate impact standard1 42 squarely in tension with the Equal Protection Clause.143 Ricci centered on the tension between protecting one
tion to the Voting Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and even No Child Left Behind may all
be affected by the court's decision, because their race-neutral practices with race-related
goals may be constitutionally suspect." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Cf GIRARDEAU
A. SPANN, THm LAW o AiIRMA riv Ac iON: TwIN I v-Fiv YEARs o SUPREME Cou RIDIECISIONS ON RACE: ANt) Rr:MI)1s 159-63 (2000) (analyzing the Supreme Court's fractured

affirmative action decisions).
139 Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593.
140 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens . Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 435 (2006);
Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-14 (1995).
141Pildes, supra note 53 (recognizing that although Title VII and the VRA are different
statutes, "it would be foolish to think that the kinds of views and responses of the Court in
Ricci concerning Title VII's disparate-impact standard will not find their way into the same
Court's treatment of disparate-impact issues under the VRA").
142 The centerpiece of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII makes it illegal for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race," among other protected characteristics. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2006). Moreover, an employer may not "limit, segregate, or classify
his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as
an employee, because of such individual's race," among other factors. Id. § 2000e-2(a) (2).
Employers also may not "adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise
alter the results of, employment related tests on the basis of race" and other protected characteristics for promotion decisions. Id. § 2000e-2(1).
143 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593 (refraining from deciding the equal protection claim because the petitioners were entitled to summary judgment on their Title VII claim); id. at
594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (observing that the majority's failure to address the equal protection claim has postponed the question of "[w]hether, or to what extent, are the disparate-impact provisions of Title VII ... consistent with the Constitution's guarantee of equal
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group from the negative effects of racially disproportionate exam results, and denying the benefits of the same exam results to another
group.144 The case involved racially disparate results on tests that the
City of New Haven used to promote its firefighters to lieutenant and
captain positions.1 45 The first round of test results revealed that the pass
rate of black candidates was approximately half the pass rate of white
candidates.146 Because promotions were awarded only to the top three
highest scoring candidates, no blacks would be promoted based on
these tests.147 Public hearings were held on the tests' disparate impact,
and the city's Civil Service Board, deadlocked on whether to certify the
list of eligible candidates for promotion, ultimately did not certify the
eligibility of any candidates.148 Firefighters who were eligible for inine-

diate promotion brought suit against New Haven's mayor, John DeStefano, and other city officials under Title VII and the Equal Protection
Clause.1 49 The city defended its actions on the ground that if the results
were certified, minority firefighters would have brought a disparate impact action under Title VII.150
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, concluded that "race-based
action like the City's in this case is impermissible under Title VII unless
the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, had it not
taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact
statute."15 1 According to the Ricci majority, the city's remedial efforts
presuiptively violated Title VII's disparate treatment prohibition absent a valid defense.152 Implicit in the Ricci decision is the notion that
remedial race consciousness is the equivalent of racial discrimination.
protection"). This tension between disparate impact and the disparate treatment standard
has existed at least since the Supreme Court first recognized disparate impact claims in
1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and later recognized reverse discrimination disparate
treatment claims by white employees in 1976, in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-79 (1976); Griggs .
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 435 (1971).
144 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 561-63.
145 Id. at 561-64. The tests were comprised of written assessments accounting for sixty
percent of the overall score and an oral assessment accounting for forty percent of the
overall score. Id.
146 Id. at 566.
147 Id. at 564.
148 Id. at 574. Minority firefighters threatened a Title VII suit if the test results were not
thrown out. Id. at 562-63.
149 Id. at 575.
150Ricci, 557 U.S. at 563.
151 Id. (emphasis added).
152 Id. at 585. Notably, the Court did not in fact engage in a disparate
treatment analysis concerning the white firefighters. Id.
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Ricci further suggests that choosing a policy or practice with a less discrininatory impact on minorities is intentionally discriminatory toward
another population. This false equivalence 5 3 forms the premise of the
Court's determination that preventive race-conscious measures are almost always illegal.154 Disparate treatment is not, however, the flipside
of a disparate impact remedy, as the Court suggests. Nor is remedial
race consciousness the legal equivalent of disparate treatment or reverse discrimination as the Court presunes.155 First, the motive underlying each of these concepts is not the same. Second, there is no legally
cognizable, historical context of discrimination toward whites as a
group. Indeed, the basis for New Haven's rejection of its test was not
the majority's reductionist determination that the higher scorers were

white; rather, the high concentration of white scorers signaled that the
test itself might be biased, and, at a Ininimuni, warranted further investigation. 156
The Supreme Court's current reticence toward disparate impact
claims in employment is not limited to race. In its 2005 decision in
Smith v. City ofJackson, Mississippi, and its 2008 decision in Meacham v.
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory, the Court held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA") does not require employers
to prove that their actions creating a disparate impact on the basis of
age are based on a business necessity.15 7 Instead, they need only prove
that the practice is based on "reasonable factors other than age"

153

See Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening Discrimina-

tion, Racing Test Fairness, 58 UCIA L. Rrv. 73, 81 (2010) (arguing that "Ricci reflects a doctrinal move towards converting efforts to rectify racial inequality into white racial injury"
and that this results in the "racing" of fairness whereby long-standing, race-neutral best
practices are viewed, unjustly, with suspicion as racial preferences).
14 This holding is the end result of a slow erosion of Title VII disparate impact jurisprudence following the Court's well-conceived and detailed treatment of disparate impact
claims in Griggs and other cases beginning in the 1970s. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436; see also,
e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist.,v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310 (1977) (holding that an overwhelming showing of statistical evidence of disparate impact in an employment setting met
the government's burden to prove disparate impact).
155 See Michelle Adams, Is Integration a DiscriminatoryPinpose?, 96 IowA L. REv. 837, 860
(2011) ("[T]he Court's shift in Ricci from a 'good faith' standard to a 'strong basis in evidence' standard is a momentous change in Tide VII law, signaling that defendants' voluntary
compliance efforts, which raise reverse-discrimination claims under the disparate-treatment
provisions of the statute, are presumptively impermissible.").
156Ricci, 557 U.S. at 586-87.
17 Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 102 (2008); Smith v. City of
Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 242 (2005); see Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006 & Supp. III 2010).
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("RFOA").158 The Court acknowledged that defendants can establish
an RFOA defense more easily than proving business necessity. 59 This
signals the Court's unwillingness to impose stricter burdens of proof on
defendants to rebut disparate impact findings.
Ricci (and, less directly, the ADEA cases) raises two important and
related questions with respect to future disparate impact claims: (1)
what is the extent of the state's ability to exercise remedial power to
counter the effects of historical discrimination, and (2) what is the
standard of proof to support a disparate impact remedy? One scholar
has referred to Ricci's requirement of proof beyond a racially adverse
impact-no matter how compelling the impact-as "disparate impact
'plus."'o60 Despite its references to legitimate policy justifications, however, the Court has not specified what evidence beyond impact alone
would suffice.161
2. Ricci's Lessons for Disparate Vote Denial
Whether Ricci will have far-reaching effects on disparate impact jurisprudence remains to be seen. What is certain is that disparities alone
will not suffice to support a challenge to government action that produces a corresponding racial effect. 162 Less clear are situations where
remedying a disparity to the benefit of racial minorities causes no corresponding disparate effect on whites.
Although the Court has held that disparities alone cannot justify a
remedy under the VRA,163 it has failed to address directly whether there
would be a different outcome in circumstances where there is no harm
to another group. The Court's holdings in this regard are rooted in its
redistricting jurisprudence, which presents a different set of concerns,

158 Meacham, 554 U.S. at 91. The ADEA's provision stating that it "shall not be unlawful
for an employer ... to take any action otherwise prohibited ... where the differentiation is
based on [RFOA]" superseded the business necessity justification that normally applies
under the disparate impact burden-shifting framework, placing the burden of persuasion
as to RFOA on the employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1) (2006 & Supp. II 2008); Wards Cove
Packing Co. . Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. . Dukes,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
159See Meacham, 554 U.S. at 97.
100 See Richard H. Pildes, Voting Rights: The Next Generation, in RACE, lrionIRM, AND
REGULATION O

THE ELECTORAL PROCESS: RECURRING PUZZLES IN TIIE AMERICAN DEMOC-

RACY 17, 26 (Guy-Uriel E. Charles et al. eds., 2011).
1el See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580.
162See supra notes 152-159 and accompanying text.
163See Smith, 109 F.3d at 595.
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more similar to the employment context than vote denial.164 Indeed,
the factual and policy contexts of Ricci and the 2010 Supreme Court
case, Lewis v. City of Chicago, differ significantly from those in vote denial
challenges.165 In the context of redistricting, like employment, the potential zero-sum calculation predominates, and few, if any, decisions
stand alone without some consequence on other groups of voters.166 For
example, drawing voters into one district versus another may potentially
impact the electability of one group's preferred candidate versus another group's. By contrast, in a disparate vote denial context-for example, invalidating a discriminatory voter ID provision or a felon disenfranchisement law, or preventing a voter purge that yields disparate racial results based on unsubstantiated criteria-the disparate impact

claim will not visit negative consequences on any racial group. Unlike in
the employment context, vote denial challenges do not involve the allocation of a limited resource; rather, the right to vote can be extended to
countless individuals without denying others access to that right. 167
To be sure, the individual and collective right to vote can be adversely impacted when the franchise is extended impermissibly. Voting
power is diluted when unlawful votes are cast. With respect to modern
vote denial measures such as voter ID laws and excessive voter purge
practices, however, proof of unlawful voting is negligible or nonexistentGS Felon disenfranchisement, though recognized in the U.S.
Constitution, 6 9 may nonetheless be held unconstitutional for inten-

14 See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
165130 S. Ct. at 2195-96; Ricci, 557 U.S. at 580.
166Cf. Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REv. 1341, 1342
(2010) (arguing that Title VII "requires employers and public officials to classify the workforce into racial categories and then allocate social goods on the basis of that classification").
Professor Richard Primus has noted that disparate impact doctrine could avoid unconstitutionality by adopting a "visible-victims reading" of disparate impact law. See id. at 1369 (asserting that, as long as a race-conscious measure does not "visibly burden specific innocent parties," it is less likely to produce a divisive social meaning and be found unconstitutional). By
this measure, Section 2's application to most voting restrictions would be constitutionally
sound, as there are no identifiable "victims" in restoring or protecting the franchise.
167 Certainly, the partisan dimensions of vote denial cannot be ignored and may be as
significant a force in the design and enforcement of these practices as any other. See
ROGOWSKI & COHEN, supra note 2, at 3. Regardless of the motivation behind vote denial
laws and practices, however, if the effect is to visit disenfranchisement disproportionately
upon minority voters, such laws may nonetheless violate the VRA.
168 See generally LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VoIER FRAu1 (2010) (arguing
that incidents of deliberate voter fraud are rare).
169 See U.S. CONsT. amend XIV, § 2; Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-53 (1974)
(discussing Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment's allowance of vote denial based on a
felony conviction).
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tional racial discrimination and other constitutional violations without
an adverse impact on non-felons' right to vote.1 70 Accordingly, remedying the disparate impact of many modern vote denial practices imposes
no hari on other voters.171
Nonetheless, the potential conflict between the Constitution and
Title VII's disparate impact standards that Ricci signals cannot be ignored. Indeed, the Court has issued the same warning with respect to
the VRA.172 The Court's trajectory on both fronts suggests an outlook
that laws that prohibit disparate impact "are constitutional only if those
impacts can be shown to reflect a racially-discriminatory purpose."173 At
a minimum, Ricci suggests that the Court will construe statutory disparate impact provisions more narrowly to evade constitutional conflicts

unless it can identify a satisfactory causal link between the challenged
conduct and the disparate harm. The causal context test proposed below would enable plaintiffs to establish this link under Section 2.
II. THE "CAUSAL CONTEXT": A DISPARATE VOTE DENIAL TEST

The inherent challenge in litigating disparate vote denial claims is
reconciling the U.S. Supreme Court's mandate that such claims be
proved with evidence beyond disparate impact, with Section 2's clear
exclusion of an intent requirement. Determining what plaintiffs must
show to succeed on a disparate vote denial claim therefore forces a
deeper examination of the Senate factors and their purpose, while vigilantly protecting against the reinsertion of an intent requirement. As
170See Hunter. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1978) (holding that a facially neutral
law disenfranchising persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude violated Equal
Protection because the law was motivated by a desire to discriminate against minorities); see
also NAACP, DEPIENDING DEIMOCRACY, supra note 111, at 12, 25-27 (explaining that these
restrictions will have a disproportionate burden on minorities because African Americans
and Latinos stiffer disproportionate rates of criminal conviction). See generallyJanai S. Nelson,
The First Amendment, Equal Protection and Felon Disenfranchisement:A New Viewpoint, 65 FA. L.
Ri v. 111 (2013) (engaging the equality principles of the First Amendment and the Equal
Protection Clause to reconsider the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement as a form of
viewpoint discrimination).
171 But see Roger Clegg, The Future of the Voting Rights Act After Bartlett and NAMUDNO,
2008-2009 (ATo Sup. CT. REv. 35, 39 (arguing that "whenever the government bans actions
(public or private) that merely have racially disparate impact, . . . . actions that are perfectly
legitimate will be abandoned," or "surreptitious-or not so surreptitious-racial quotas will
be adopted so that the action is no longer racially disparate in its impact").
172 See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
173 Pildes, supra note 53 ("[I]t would be unconstitutional for Congress to make disparate impacts illegal if they cannot be shown to reflect an underlying discriminatory purpose. That is, impact can be looked to ... as evidence of purpose.... But impact alone
cannot be a constitutional basis for making a state law/practice illegal.").

2013]

The Causal Context ofDisparate Vote Denial: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act

613

noted above, the text of Section 2 and its legislative history provide important guidelines for formulating a test for disparate vote denial.174 By
prohibiting voting qualifications and other election practices that "result[] in a denial or abridgement of the right ... to vote on account of
race or color, or [status as a language minority],"175 Section 2 not only
makes clear on its face that it applies equally to vote denial claims, but
also establishes that the focus of the inquiry is on the result of the challenged law's application and not its cause or intent. 176 Neither the text
nor the legislative history of Section 2, however, provides specific directives for litigating vote denial claims.177 Accordingly, against a backdrop
of ambitious academic proposals and judicial skepticism concerning
disparate impact, I propose the causal context test as a new formulation

for evaluating disparate vote denial claims.
A. Existing ProposalsforDisparateVote Denial Tests
Over time, there has been a battery of proposals for Section 2 vote
denial tests derived from Section 2 cases, the language of the statute,
and evidentiary considerations.178 One detailed treatment of these
proposals identifies two categories of tests- "causation and impactplus"1 79 and "inverse relation" 8 0-and introduces an additional one,
which I refer to as "prerequisites and burden-shifting."181 The causation
See supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2006).
176 See id.; see also Tokaji, supra note 53, at 709 ("The language of Section 2 indicates
that the results standard applies to vote denial claims as well as vote dilution claims.").
There was never any question that Section 2's totality of the circumstances analysis applied
to vote denial claims. The application became dubious, however, when vote dilution standards were awkwardly grafted onto vote denial claims. Id.
177Tokaji, supra note 53, at 709 ("The legislative history of the 1982 amendments ...
provides little guidance on how Section 2 should apply to practices resulting in the disproportionate denial of minority votes. That is mainly because Congress, especially the Senate,
focused so intently on representation rather than participation.").
178 See id. at 718-23 (discussing previously proposed Section 2 vote denial tests).
179Id. at 722 (labeling cases that require more than just disparate impact as "causation
and impact-plus tests").
180 See Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal Access Theory
for Interesting Times, 34 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1171, 1197 & n.109 (2001) (collecting fair housing
cases and scholarly opinions that the author considers "highly instructive" for VRA disparate
impact analysis).
181 Specifically, the prerequisites and burden-shifting test operates as follows:
174

175

[A] plaintiff should be required to show both (1) that the practice challenged
results in the disproportionate denial of minority votes (i.e., that it has a disparate impact on minority voters); and (2) that this disparate impact is traceable to the challenged practice's interaction with social and historical condi-
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and inipact-plus test is "a sort of under-the-table balancing of the governnent's interest in the challenged practice against its vote-denying
impact" that "allow[s] judges to consider the justifications the government proffers for adopting or keeping the voting practice in ques18 2
tion."
This test is also referred to as "disparate impact-plus," and tacitly relies on proximate cause to justify a finding of liability.
The inverse relation test borrows from Fair Housing Act jurisprudence, and proposes that vote denial claims be determined as follows:
"The more severe the racial disparity of voting access that results from a
challenged practice, the more tenuous the justification should be seen
to be, even if that justification is asserted to have nothing to do with
race."

183

This proposal modifies the "causation and inpact-plus" test by

squarely establishing an inverse relationship between the tenuousness
of the justification and the racial disparity that the challenged practice
causes. 184
In the case of the prerequisites and burden-shifting test-the most
compelling of these tests-the burden shifts to the defendant once disparate impact has been established, on the theory that state actors "are
in the best position to explain why they believe vote-denying practices
are necessary to achieve some vital interest." 185 The test also incorporates certain standards from the equal protection jurisprudence developed in jury discrimination cases.186 In particular, it relies on the burden-shifting model in jury selection cases as further support for incorporating this framework in disparate vote denial cases. 187

tions. These might be thought of as "preconditions" to Section 2 vote denial
claims, analogous to the three Gingles preconditions for Section 2 vote dilution claims....
Once the plaintiff[] make [s] a prima facie disparate-impact case by producing evidence of the[se] two elements ... the burden should shift to the
defendant to justify the challenged practice ....
... [T] he government should be required to show the challenged practice
is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest.

Tokaji, supra note 53, at 724-26 (footnote omitted).
182 Id. at 722.
13 Pershing, supra note 180, at 1199.
184 See id. at 1197 & n.109.
185 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 725 (citing Griggs . Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971)).
186 Id.
187

Id.
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Like the causation and inpact-plus and inverse relation tests, the
prerequisites and burden-shifting test invites the wrong query. First, if
an electoral practice does not directly cause a disparate impact, it is less
relevant whether the law is narrowly tailored.SS The argument is not
that the state could apply a particular election law in a manner that is
less discriminatory. Rather, the argument is that the law, which may be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest, combines with social conditions external to voting to produce an unlawful
discriminatory result. The result is discriminatory because the disparate
impact would not have occurred but for the race of the voter. Put another way, if the voters were of a different race, the denial would not
have occurred to the extent that it has, and there would be no (or per-

haps less) disparate impact.
Second, although the state's burden to proffer a compelling interest is high, the state is likely to meet this burden in certain disparate
vote denial contexts. For example, in the case of felon disenfranchisement, courts are likely to find the state's interest compelling in light of
the Supreme Court's unwavering reliance on Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as support for states' ability to deny the right to vote based on felon status.189 A similar, but less
certain, argument could be made with respect to voter ID statutes in
light of the Supreme Court's 2008 holding, in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board, that states have a right to protect against fraud in elections even when the only proof of fraud originated from outside the
state. 190 Accordingly, the muscle of the prerequisites and burdenshifting test may be undermined with respect to certain categories of
vote denial claims, and potentially all vote denial claims in light of
states' broad constitutional authority to regulate the time, place, and
manner of elections.' 9'
Third, by minimizing plaintiffs' burden of proof through the use
of prerequisites, the test leaves plaintiffs in a substantially weaker position in presenting proof to counterbalance the state's interest. Even
with the highest scrutiny applied to defendants' justifications, plaintiffs
1I
The tenuousness of the state's policy for the challenged practice, however, is relevant. See infra notes 248-263 and accompanying text. The narrow tailoring of a law could
be relevant to the evaluation of its tenuousness.
189See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974) (holding that the disenfranchisement of convicted felons did not deny equal protection); see also Dillenburg v. Kramer, 469
E2d 1222, 1226 (9th Cir. 1972) (casting doubt on the policy justifications for felon disfranchisement statutes).
190See553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008).
191See U.S. CONst . art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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presenting evidence limited to (1) disparate impact, or (2) traceability
to a social condition external to the electoral process, will not have
availed themselves of the full breadth of the totality of the circumstances analysis. As one scholar has noted with respect to the strict scrutiny applied to the state's justifications, this "high standard tracks that
of constitutional race discrimination clairns."1 92 Thus, the test threatens
to import an intent standard by permitting states to offer justifications
for discriminatory impact rather than requiring states to demonstrate
that the resulting disparate impact is not on account of race-by showing, for example, that race merely correlates with, but does not cause,
the disparate impact.
Moreover, the prerequisites and burden-shifting test leaves unan-

swered the question of how to prove discrimination external to voting
in a manner that satisfies Section 2. If plaintiffs make too cursory a
showing of Senate factor five as a prerequisite, they risk having inadequate evidentiary support for their claims. The test's burden-shifting
and strict scrutiny standard tempers this result.193 The Crawford Court,
however, dismissed strict scrutiny in connection with equal protection
claims in a decision postdating this proposal.194 Crawford virtually elininates any prospect of the Court adopting this standard in connection
with Section 2.
Finally, similar to the causation and impact-plus and inverse relation tests, the narrow focus on disparate impact and Senate factor five
diminishes the importance of other potentially relevant Senate factors,
such as the tenuousness of the state's policy and other contextual factors. 195 Moreover, each of the tests predate the Supreme Court's 2009
decision in Ricci v. DeStefano and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit's 2010 decision in Farrakhanv. Gregoire (FarrakhanIV)both of which greatly temper expectations of the Court's willingness to
impose significant burdens of proof on the states.19 6
192 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 726.

193 See supra notes 178-192 and accompanying text.
194 Crawford, 553 U.S. at 188. Indeed, the Court's apparent readiness to disregard the
significance of the other Senate factors as pertinent only to vote dilution and not to vote
denial claims concedes too much. See id. It denies plaintiffs the opportunity to prove the
larger context of bias in which these facially neutral practices operate, so that overarching
concerns of fairness and bias can be taken into account.
195 Tokaji, supra note 53, at 725 (suggesting that "[u]nlike most of the other Senate
factors, [Senate factor B] seems quite germane to vote denial cases because of its focus on
qualification Is]' and 'prerequisite [s]' to voting, among other things").
196 See Ricci. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009); Farrakhan v. Gregoire (Farrakhan
IV), 590 F.3d 989, 1016 (9th Cir.), aff'd in part, overruled in part en banc, 623 F.3d 990 (9th
Cir. 2010) (FarrakhanV). Although Ricci's reach beyond the employment context is still
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More recently, however, one scholar has introduced a Section 2
analysis that relies on proof of a "significant likelihood" of race-biased
decision making by majority-group actors that results in denying minority voters an equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice.197
On the strength of Section 2's legislative history and constitutional context, this proposal states that: (1) Section 2 provides causes of action
against both participation and dilution injuries; (2) an injury within the
meaning of Section 2 arises only when political inequalities are due to
race-biased decision making; and (3) plaintiffs, although not required
to prove race-biased decision making by a preponderance of the evidence, must nonetheless show "to a significant likelihood" that the in198
I1
jury of which they complain resulted from race-biased decisions.
brief, the significant likelihood test investigates the role that race plays
in one's ability to cast a vote. If a voter were white, would he or she face
the same barriers to the same degree? If the answer is no, then it would
appear that the voter has succeeded in showing "to a significant likelihood" that the injury of which he or she complained resulted from
race-biased decisions.' 9 9 The significant likelihood test endeavors to
strike a different evidentiary balance than the other tests and largely
succeeds. However, the test still requires some showing of racial bias
which threatens to read intent back into Section 2 even if the standard
of proof is less burdensome.
B. The Theory of Causal Context
The tests and proposals referenced above are a certain improvement upon the general ambiguity that surrounds vote denial claims involving statistical disparities and evidence of bias. However, what I have
termed the "causal context" test-not to be confused with the causal
unknown, it provides some indication of the Court's waning receptivity to disparate impact
claims based on race. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 593. Accordingly, since the prerequisites and burden-shifting test relies in part on the Title VII burden-shifting framework, it is important to
note that although the test is still valid, Ricci may undermine the soundness of its reliance
on Title VII jurisprudence. See id.; Tokaji, supra note 53, at 725 ("Just as employers in Title
VII cases must show that a challenged employment practice is justified by a 'business necessity,' state and local election officials would have to show that a challenged voting practice is justified by an 'electoral necessity' once a prima facie disparate-impact case has been
made.").
197 See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, UnconstitutionalElections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U. PA. L. Rrv. 377, 417, 425-29 (2012).
198Id. at 417.
199See id.; see also Foster, supra note 7, at 1474 (using disparate impact as a proxy for intent to determine "whether an adverse decision or outcome more likely than not resulted
from the influence of indicia historically associated with status-based discrimination").
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connection standard, which simulates proximate cause 200-denands a
"softer" causal link than causal connection and continues to consider
racial bias external to voting as envisioned by the Senate factors. Indeed,
the causal context test proposed here recognizes that modern-day voting discrimination is contextual if nothing else. Causal context recognizes that a neutral voting practice or procedure can exist within a context of racial inequality and implicit bias that produces a discriminatory
result in the electoral arena. The fact that the causal context does not
require direct causation also recognizes that the nexus between the
harm and the instrument is not necessarily linear. Rather, the causal
context threads together coexisting and mutually reinforcing factors
that transport racial inequality in society into the election arena. Put

another way, when racial disparities in voting cannot be explained in
race-neutral terms, there is a potential VRA violation. The familiar air of
this test to those well-acquainted with Section 2 is not coincidental.
Causal context derives from the Senate factors and the core values they
reflect, and updates Section 2's totality of the circumstances test by expressly including a broader range of evidence of discriminationnamely, implicit bias. 201
For example, an electoral practice denies or abridges the right to
vote on account of race in violation of Section 2 if it produces a disparate impact because of racial inequality outside the electoral arena that
interacts with the practice to reproduce racial disparities within the
electoral arena. 202 This differs procedurally from the current standard

200 Before an en banc decision ultimately vacated the judgment in FarrakhanI' a panel
of the Ninth Circuit defined the causal connection standard for Section 2 claims challenging
felon disenfranchisement as a but-for connection between the election law and the disparate
impact that results from intentional discrimination in the criminal justice system. See Farrakhanv. Washington (FarrakhanH1), 338 F.3d 1009, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003). This definition was
based on the district court's holding that evidence "that African, Hispanic and Native Americans are targeted for prosecution of serious crimes and ... overrepresented in prison populations" may "establish a causal connection between Washington's disenfranchisement
scheme and the denial of voting rights to racial minorities." See Farrakhan v. Locke (Farrakhan I), 987 E Supp. 1304, 1312 (E.D. Wash. 1997); see also Ortiz v. City of Phila. Office of the
City Conn'rs Voter Registration Div., 28 E3d 306, 309-10 (3d Cir. 1994) (relying on a causal
connection analysis to hold that purging statutes allowing the removal of inactive voters from
registration lists did not violate the Voting Rights Act).
201See supra notes 58-81 and accompanying text.
202 The impact must be statistically significant. See Tokaji, supra note 53, at 725 n.251
(proposing that "where the differential impact of a voting procedure is relatively slight,"
courts may "requir[e] that any disparities be statistically significant and ... impos[e] a
lower burden of justification on the state where the racial disparity is de minimis"). This
requirement is inherent in the finding of a disparate, as opposed to a different, impact. To
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by recognizing that proof of disparate impact may serve as a threshold
showing, effectively replacing the prerequisites in vote dilution cases
established by the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Thornburg v.
Gingles.203 This inquiry is analytically distinct from an inquiry into
whether the policy itself is race neutral or whether the state's justifications are insufficient. Instead, plaintiffs must offer proof to permit the
court to make an independent finding that racial inequality has permeated the electoral arena. Inequality that is transported into elections
is potentially discriminatory and cannot be explained in terms other
than race, regardless of whether the bias is implicit or explicit.
Unlike the other tests, causal context follows the existing precedent that Section 2 requires more than statistical proof of disparate im-

pact, 20 4 yet it does not upend the totality of the circumstances analysis,
replace it with a balancing test, or overvalue the tenuousness factor.
Rather, causal context recognizes the relevance of Senate factor five
without overstating its weight or displacing the potential relevance of
other factors. 205 Other Senate factors and considerations may be relevant in disparate vote denial cases, and courts should consider each
factor in light of the unique circumstances of the case. Likewise, consistent with Section 2's totality of the circumstances analysis, compelling
evidence of one Senate factor could prove outcome-determinative. 206
For example, if plaintiffs proffer compelling evidence that a law or system of laws results in the racially discriminatory deprivation of minorities' right to vote, that abridgment suffices to prove the claim. Other, or
additional, evidence supporting alternative factors that are of less relevance to the plaintiffs' claim are superfluous.

ensure that the impact is indeed measurable and meaningful, however, I have included a
requirement of statistical significance.
203 See supra notes 58-81 and accompanying text (discussing the Gingles prerequisites).
204 See, e.g., Smith v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 109 E3d 586,
595 (9th Cir. 1997); Irby . Va. State Bd. of Elections, 889 F.2d 1352, 1358-59 (4th Cir. 1989).
205 See FarrakhanIV 590 F.3d at 1004.
Although the district court was required to consider the "totality of the circumstances," not all of the Senate Factors were equally relevant, or even necessary, to that analysis in this case. Some Senate Factors may be relevant as
circumstantial evidence with respect to certain vote denial claims, but proof
of those Factors was not required where, under Factor 5, Plaintiffs provided
strong, indeed "compelling," direct evidence of the alleged violation.
Id.
206

See id.
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1. The Role of Implicit Bias
Some of the potentially relevant evidence in the causal context
analysis is proof of implicit bias. As noted above, the Senate factors reveal that evidence of implicit bias can be used to prove racial discrinination both within and outside the electoral arena for purposes of establishing disparate vote denial. 207 Implicit bias refers to discrimination
that occurs unintentionally based on assumptions and prejudices that
operate beneath the actor's radar of cognition.2 0S As commentators
have noted, implicit bias acknowledges that ."[in]any mental processes
function implicitly, or outside conscious attentional focus,' including
attitudes and stereotypes." 209 Recent studies of implicit bias within the
law, and the electoral process in particular, may prove to be a game
changer for disparate impact claims in voting and beyond. 210 Implicit
bias evidence provides an important window into the pernicious vestiges of de jure discrimination that can easily fall off the legal radar.
In 2006, in the vote dilution case, League of United Latin American
Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), the Supreme Court gave a nod to the evidentiary potential of implicit bias in the electoral arena. 211 Writing for the
majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy cited as potential proof of discrimination the contextual evidence that new rules were enacted just as minority voters were gaining sufficient political power to potentially influence the outcome of elections.212 Justice Kennedy noted, with suspicion,
that when the Latino community in Texas's District 23 was poised to exercise the newfound political power that its increased population had
fueled, the State sought to redraw the district to decrease the number of
207 See

supra notes 82-102 and accompanying text.
See Lawrence, supra note 30, at 319.
209 Ivan E. Bodensteiner, The Implications of PsychologicalResearch Related to Unconscious Discrimination and Implicit Bias in Proving IntentionalDiscrminiation, 73 Mo. L. Rrv. 83, 102 (2008)
(quoting Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 31, at 947-48). Professor Ivan Bodensteiner defines "attitude" as "an 'evaluative disposition,' such as a 'tendency to like or dislike,"' and
notes that "one's implicit attitudes may differ from 'explicit attitudes' toward the same subject." Id.
210 See supra note 30. Despite the recency of many implicit bias studies, the application
of implicit bias is not anachronistic in Section 2 analyses. As this Subsection of the Article
explains, certain Senate factors are premised on the concept of implicit or unconscious
bias. To be sure, there is certainly more work to be done in understanding the potential
role of implicit bias in disparate impact claims generally and Section 2 claims specifically as
courts are increasingly skeptical about claims of general societal discrimination. Importantly, the implicit biases recognized by the Senate factors are rooted in a particular context and carefully connect to specific racial disparities.
211 See548 U.S. 399, 442 (2006).
212 Id. at 440.
208
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Latinos in it.213 Texas's redrawing of District 23's boundaries, which excluded sizeable portions of its Latino community, took "away the Latinos' opportunity because Latinos were about to exercise it."214 One
scholar has argued that Justice Kennedy's analysis in LULAC may not
hinge upon racial discrimination per se and has suggested instead that
"the State may have intentionally discriminated in a way that is constitutionally actionable because it intended to deprive the group of an electoral opportunity. The intent that matters is the intent to cause a particular effect: the intent to burden." 215 This view focuses on "representational rights," such as the right to vote and burdens on political
participation, as opposed to racial discrimination. 216 Indeed, it appears
that Justice Kennedy may have been intimating a broader concern

about state infringement on group political power when race looms
prominently in the background.2 17
Alternatively, LULAC may simply be rereading intent into Section 2
by equating the state's actions with proof of intentional discrimnination-the intent to burden.2 18 The causal context analysis suggests,
however, that without expressly characterizing it as such, the Court effectively determined that the contextual evidence of Texas's redistricting was proof of Senate factor B, which evaluates the tenuousness of the
state policy.219 This would be perfectly consistent with the Court's holding that Texas violated Section 2, and it reflects a more expansive consideration of the context in which discriminatory state action occurs.

213 Id.

214Id. ("This bears the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal
protection violation.").
215Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Race, Redisticting, and Representation, 68 On11o ST. L.J. 1185,
1208 (2007).
216See id. at 1196-1202. The notion of representational rights derives in part from Justice
Kennedy's concurrence in the Supreme Court's 2004 decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer,where, in
discussing the relevance of the First Amendment in the political gerrymandering context, he
noted that "[t]he inquiry is not whether political classifications were used[,] .... [but] instead is whether political classifications were used to burden a group's representational
rights." See 541 U.S. 267, 315 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Charles, supra note 215, at 1201 ("In constitutional law there are types of State justifications
that cannot justify certain types of burdens upon groups or individuals; these impermissible
justifications are sometimes referred to as exclusionary reasons.") (citing Richard H. Pildes,
AvoidingBalancing:The Role ofExclusionary Reasons in ConstitutionalLaw, 45 HAsTINGS L.J. 711,
712 (1994) (arguing that courts rely on a qualitative process to balance incommensurable
concepts such as individual rights and state interests)).
217 See Charles, supra note 215, at 1200-02.
218See id. at 1207-08.
219 See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 442; supra note 69 and accompanying text (discussing Senate
factor B).
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Had the Court employed a causal context analysis in LULAC, it would
have stated expressly that the evidence of burgeoning Latino political
power and the lack of credible justifications for reconfiguring the district's population were not merely coincidental factors, but instead reflected an implicit bias against the representational rights of Latino citizens. The Court also would have made clear that these factors, along
with evidence of historical discrimination against Latinos in Texas,
caused the State's politically neutral justification to result in discrimination in violation of Section 2. Instead, the Court was ambiguous about
its specific valuation of the state's actions in light of growing Latino political power.220
Depending on the circumstances, the actor exhibiting implicit bias

can be: (1) the state-for example, legislators who adopt the challenged voting practice or the discriminatory measure; (2) citizens-for
example, voters who engage in racially polarized voting; or (3) quasistate actors-for example, political parties that pursue laws and practices both for their disproportionate impact on minority voters and for
partisan interests. In each of these cases, implicit, as opposed to explicit, bias might be the driving force behind the challenged action.
Moreover, at least three of the Senate factors relevant to vote denial
claims invite evidence of implicit bias: racially polarized voting (factor
two), subtle racial appeals (factor six), and the tenuousness of the
state's policy (factor B). 221
Evidence of racially polarized voting does not ascribe intent to majority-group voters who vote as a bloc to thwart the ability of minority
voters to elect candidates of their choice. 222 Racially polarized voting
"means simply that the race of voters correlates with the selection of a
certain candidate or candidates; that is, it refers to the situation where
different races (or minority language groups) vote in blocs for different
candidates."2 23 Nonetheless, courts have repeatedly determined that
evidence of racially polarized voting reveals a subtext of racial discrimi-

220 Charles, supra note 215, at 1211; see LULAC, 548 U.S. at 442.
221 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
222 See Thornburg . Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 62 (1986) (plurality opinion) (holding that
the legal concept of racially polarized voting incorporates neither causation nor intent).
223 Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, and ote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 HARV. L. Riv. 1385, 1393 (2010) (quoting
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 62 (plurality opinion)); see also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 53 n.21 (majority opinion) (quoting political scientist Bernard Grofnan's definition of racial polarization as "a
consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the voter votes,
... [or when] black voters and white voters vote differently" (first alteration in original)).
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nation. 224 Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed internal conflict
over the extent to which the cause of racially polarized voting is relevant to the Section 2 inquiry.22j White voters may vote against minority
voters' candidate of choice intentionally to discriminate22 6 because of
implicit bias against minority candidates or minority voters, or with no
intent or bias at all. 227 The resulting disparate impact on the right to
224 See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens.
Clements, 999 F.2d 831, 850 (5th
Cir. 1993) (en banc) (expressly rejecting the district court's conclusion that to prove racially polarized voting, "plaintiffs need only demonstrate that whites and blacks generally
support different candidates to establish legally significant white bloc voting"); Salas v. Sw.
Tex. Junior Coll. Dist., 964 E2d 1542, 1554 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the inquiry into
racially polarized voting "aims at determining whether it is racial voting patterns, along
with other objective factors, rather than some other set of causes, that explain the lack of
electoral success of voters within the protected class"). Indeed, the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit requires "an inquiry into the causal relationship between the challenged practice and the lack of electoral success by the protected class voters." See Salas,
964 F.2d at 1554; see also Katz et al., supra note 73, at 670-71 (surveying courts' applications
of the three Gingles prerequisites, including racially polarized voting); Randolph M. ScottMcLaughlin, The Voting Rights Act and the "New and Improved" Intent Test: Old Wine in New
Bottles, 16 TouRO L. Riv. 943, 960-77 (2000) (exploring various judicial interpretations of
Gingles's conflicting opinions).
225 In her concurrence in GinglesJustice Sandra Day O'Connor noted that "[e]vidence
that a candidate preferred by the minority group . . . was rejected by white voters for reasons other than those which made that candidate the preferred choice of the minority
group would seem clearly relevant in answering the question whether bloc voting by white
voters will consistently defeat minority candidates." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 100 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor argued that this view did not require a
rejection of the majority approach, however, and instead agreed that factors other than
race caused the divergence in minority xoting patterns. See id. Justice O'Connor further
noted that:

Insofar as statistical evidence of divergent racial voting patterns is admitted
solely to establish that the minority group is politically cohesive and to assess
its prospects for electoral success, I agree that defendants cannot rebut this
showing by offering evidence that the divergent racial voting patterns may be
explained in part by causes other than race, such as an underlying divergence
in the interests of minority and white voters.
Id.
226 By recognizing that implicit bias can fuel racially polarized voting, the casual context analysis would not read an intent requirement back into Section 2. See generally Elizabeth M. Ryan, Note, Causationor Correlation?The Inpact of LULAC v. Clements on Section 2
Lawsuits in the Fifth Circuit, 107 Micii. L. REv. 675 (2009) (critiquing the inclusion of a
causation requirement in racially polarized xoting analyses as a direct contravention of the
1982 VRA amendments). Rather, causal context recognizes that the correlation that racially polarized voting seeks to establish may represent bias in the electoral process that is
otherwise undetectable but equally pernicious.
227 As two scholars have noted, "The implicit cognitive processes might heavily influence
the final choice of a voter who does not otherwise clearly embrace one candidate over another." Gregory S. Parks &Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, ImplicitBias, Election '08, and the Myth of a PostRacialAmerica, 37 FA. SI. U. L. Rrv. 659, 684 (2010).
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vote-either in the form of vote denial or vote dilution-should nonetheless be actionable if the surrounding racial context suggests that
race determines electability in whole or in part.
Likewise, evidence of "subtle racial appeals" under Senate factor six
may result front intentional discrimination or implicit bias that fuels discrinination against minority voters' candidates of choice. 228 The Senate
Report's distinction between "overt" and "subtle" racial appeals in the
Senate factors invites this nuance.229 Similarly, by seeking evidence of
the "tenuousness" of state policy, Senate factor B not only triggers a
qualitative analysis of the state's justifications for purposes of evaluating
the legitimacy of an election law and its purported goals, but also pernits courts to attribute a pretext of discrimination to state action when

the justifications are insufficient. 23 0 This finding of pretext does not
necessarily result from explicit bias, but may well be the result of implicit
bias that the weakness of the state's justifications reveals. Indeed, tenu228 See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982) (emphasis added), repTinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
177, 206; Katz et al., supra note 73, at 707-17 (summarizing the various types of evidence that
constitute racial appeals, including ones that could be characterized as implicit bias, such as
in-group and out-group references, discussion of racially charged issues, photo manipulation,
and candidate intimidation).
229 See S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29. The distinction between overt and subtle appeals is often blurred. At least two scholars have noted that some explicit racial appeals can nevertheless mask conscious discrimination. See Leland Ware & David C. Wilson, fim Crow on the
"Down Low": Subtle Racial Appeals in Presidential Campaigns, 24 ST. JollN'S J. LEGAL COMMEN 1. 299, 300 n.4 (2009) (charactering as "subtle racial appeals" those campaign appeals
that "allow individuals to attribute their attitudes to ostensibly non-racial information and
to justify their behavior in race-neutral terms").
230 See Terrazas . Clements, 581 F. Supp. 1329, 1345 n.24 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (stating that
"[t]he principal probative weight of a tenuous state policy is its propensity to show pretext"). But see United States v. Marengo Cnty. Comn'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1571 (11th Cir.
1984) (stating that the Zimmer factor of a nontenuous state policy (Senate factor B) is
among the least important of the factors for determining vote dilution); Andrew P. Miller
& Mark A. Packman, Amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: What Is the Intent of the Results
Test?, 36 EMORY L.J. 1, 23 (1987) (noting that, although some courts have continued to
rely on tenuousness as a relevant factor after the 1982 amendments, others have found
that it lacks probative value). The conclusion that tenuousness is less relevant to the Section 2 results inquiry than to the intent inquiry ignores the probative value of context. By
demonstrating a lack ofjustification for the state policy, courts can discern implicit bias in
the policy's incoherence. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 986
F.2d 728, 753 (5th Cir.) (stating that the tenuousness of state policy was evidence of discriminatory results, but the existence of a legitimate state policy did not preclude a finding
of vote dilution), rev'd en banc, 999 E2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993); Westwego Citizens for Better
Gov't v. City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1201-11 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); McMillan . Escambia Cnty., Fla., 748 F.2d 1037, 1045 (5th Cir. 1984) (noting that tenuousness is circumstantial evidence of an election system's discriminatory results); Marengo Cnty. Comm 'n, 731
F.2d at 1571 (same); Houston v. Haley, 663 F. Supp. 346, 355-56 (N.D. Miss. 1987) (same),
aff'd, 859 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1988), and vacated 869 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1989).
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ousness is "relevant insofar as intent is relevant to [the] result: evidence
that a voting device was intended to discriminate is circumstantial evidence that the device has a discriminatory result. Moreover, the tenuousness of the justification for a state policy may indicate that the policy
is unfair."23 Finally, the breadth of Senate factor five's exploration of
the interaction of societal discrimination with election laws is another
potential entry point for implicit bias evidence. Implicit bias can result
in discrimination outside the electoral arena and interact with raceneutral election laws to cause discrimination in elections.
The common thread among these Senate factors is that they reveal
discrimination and bias through action and choices that the actor may
or may not acknowledge or of which the actor may or may not be cog-

nizant. If bias motivates the result, it taints the electoral process regardless of the actor's intent. Notably, implicit bias may be closer to the evidentiary standard that the Court envisioned than to pure, statistically
based disparate impact. Indeed, the Court's rejection of evidence of
statistical disparity as the sole basis of a Section 2 claim and Congress's
clear exclusion of an intent requirement under Section 2 leaves the
door open for implicit bias evidence to provide a direct causal link between state action and vote denial.
The role of implicit bias in election law deserves more extensive
treatment than can be provided here. For now, it suffices to acknowledge that, conceptually, implicit bias is not new to the Section 2 analysis
and, most certainly, infects a wide array of election administration practices that fall within the scope of the VRA. 232 Importantly, however, recognizing the role of evidence of the electoral arena's implicit bias in
the Section 2 analysis should not undermine the results standard and
its concomitant ban on intent. Without care, permitting evidence of
implicit bias can become a backdoor reentry of the intent standard by
weaving a search for intent or purpose into the Section 2 analysis. Such
a result would compromise the core values, legislative history, and plain
language of Section 2.
As these cases and examples indicate, implicit bias evidence, although not a new concept, is still a developing evidentiary standard.
Nonetheless, the resurgence and expansion of studies on how implicit
Marengo Cnty. Comm 'n, 731 F.2d at 1571 (citation omitted).
For a discussion of implicit bias in elections, see LeRoy, supra note 30, at 1592-95
(discussing how partisan elections may cause judges to distribute justice based on political
contributions); Page & Pitts, supra note 30, at 22 (discussing how unconscious bias may
play a role in the interaction between poll workers and prospective voters, and suggesting
means of mitigating its impact).
231
232
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bias affects different spheres of law holds promise in voting rights litigation. As part of the causal context analysis, implicit bias provides an additional source of information regarding whether a given election law is
operating in a climate of inequality and discrimination and transmitting those effects to the electoral arena. Finally, evidence of implicit
bias fits squarely within the Supreme Court's constricted reading of the
VRA in seminal cases such as Shaw v. Reno, 233 Miller v. Johnson,23 4 and
Shaw v. Hunt.235 Implicit bias provides the missing link between external factors and internal impact that has been the source of consternation for the Court. The causal context analysis of Section 2 is instead a
more expansive method of linking modern vote denial practices to current social and historical climates of discrimination.

2. The Standard of Proof for External Discrimination
Another looming question is whether the evidence of discrimination external to voting that Senate factor five solicits must demonstrate
intent, whether statistical disparities can prove it, or whether it is subject to some other standard. Initially, the Farrakhan IV court determined that there was compelling evidence of discrimination based on
evidence of statistical disparities, as well as a qualitative analysis by
qualified experts who determined that the disparities were not race
neutral. 236 This is neither direct proof of intent nor evidence of statistical disparities; rather, this proof constituted circumstantial evidence of
discrimination in Washington State's criminal justice system and a narrative of inequality 23 7 Nonetheless, sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit
jettisoned the plaintiffs' Section 2 claim on the ground that they did
not prove that the discrimination in the state's criminal justice system
was intentional.23S
To require evidence of intentional discrimination with respect to
any of the Senate factors is problematic for several reasons. First, it
would require Section 2 plaintiffs to prove a case of intentional discrimination within a Section 2 case in order to sustain a claim. Not only
is this approach inconsistent with Section 2's application to date, but it
imposes a burden on plaintiffs that Section 2 does not require, and,
233 509

U.S. 630, 657 (1993).
U.S. 900, 919 (1995).
235 517 U.S. 899, 912 (1996).
236FarrakhanIV, 590 .3d at 997.
237 Id. at 1004.
238Farrakhan 1, 623 .3d at 993 (affirming that felon disenfranchisement laws may be
challenged under Section 2 of the VRA).
234 515
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indeed, runs directly counter to Section 2.239 Importantly, the concern
regarding the level of proof of discrimination required is not based
solely on the notion that a stringent proof standard would reintroduce
an intent standard into Section 2. Indeed, contrary to the assertion of
many Section 2 supporters, requiring that intent be proved is not a
backdoor reinsertion of an intent standard because requiring that intent be proved external to voting is not the same as requiring that it is
proved with respect to voting. Instead, the problem with requiring proof
of intent in the discrimination external to voting is that it fundamen-

tally misses the point of Section 2 (and indeed the VRA as a whole),
which is to recognize that electoral practices do not operate in a vacuuni. Rather, they interact with social conditions, including state policies and practices infused with bias, and at times, even intentional discrinination, to compromise the integrity of the electoral process as a
neutral, "race-free zone" or a sphere of society that race minimally impacts. This approach is consistent with the standard of proof applied to
date to Senate factor five and to other Senate factors.240
It is easy to conflate the FarrakhanIlholding that statistical disparities in voting are insufficient by themselves to prove a Section 2 violation
with the notion that statistical disparities are insufficient to establish
proof of Senate factor five. That conflation distorts the purpose of the
Section 2 inquiry and contradicts the Court's historical treatment of discrimination external to voting. 241 For example, the Supreme Court has
held that Congress has the authority to prohibit literacy tests because
such tests import discrimination from the education system into the political process. 242 Similarly, in considering other Senate factors, such as
the use of racial appeals in elections (Senate factor six) or inadequate
responsiveness on the part of government officials (Senate factor A),
239 See Ryan P. Haygood, Disregarding the Results: Examining the Ninth Circuit's Heightened Section 2 "IntentionalDiscrimination"Standard in Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 111 Cot umt. L. Rrv. SIm:BAR 51, 57 (2011), http://www.colimbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/51
Haygood.pdf (critiquing the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in which it held that plaintiffs
must prove that the state's criminal justice system was "infected by intentional discrimination"(quoting FarrakhanV 623 E3d at 993)).
240 SeeFarrakhan IV 590 F.3d at 1005.
241 See Tokaji, supra note 53, at 722 (arguing that to require proof of intentional discrimination "makes little sense ... if the results test is supposed to serve as a prophylactic
against voting practices ... adopted or retained due to intentional discrimination that
would be difficult to prove in court," and that "[s]uch intent may exist whether or not
there has been intentional discrimination external to the voting process.").
242 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 117, 133 (1970) (unanimous decision) (holding
that Congress has the power to ban literacy tests based in part on the record of "substantial
if not overwhelming" racial discrimination in education).
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Section 2 does not require that these factors be proved according to the
legal standard befitting an independent legal claim on that basis. Likewise, with respect to Senate factor five, it is not necessary to offer proof
of external discrimination that would satisfy an independent claim sufficient to sustain a remedy for that discrimination itself.
Because plaintiffs are not seeking relief for the external discrinination itself, they should not be required to prove the existence of that
external discrimination in the same way that they would if they were
directly seeking relief for the discrimination. Instead, Section 2's causal
context analysis permits plaintiffs to prove discrimination sufficient to
dispose of the argument that the disparate impact of the electoral practice is entirely race neutral. 243 To the extent that racial disparities exist

and are inexplicable in race-neutral terms, the direct cause of those
disparities should be found unlawful, or at least, as in the case of the
remedy provided for by the VRA, suspended until the disparity is cured
or race-neutral justifications prevail. 244
The extensive evidence of unconscious bias in society and its resulting disparate impact on the electoral process challenge the Supreie Court's now-entrenched rejection of disparate impact proof as
independently sufficient to prove a claim. 245 The traditional understanding of disparate impact before such proof became relevant was
that disparate impact is the result of natural forces-that the externalities were too varied and far-reaching to discern any measurable animus
that might justify a remedy based on race. 246 Implicit bias research
turns this presumption on its head, giving even the most ardent "intentbased" defenders something to hang their hats on. 247 Indeed, racial
animus is racial animus, even if it is unintended or unconscious.
3. Tenuousness of the State Policy
In addition to evidence of external discrimination, evidence of
tenuousness contributes to the totality of the circumstances inquiry by
243 This approach might be called "process of elimination" discrimination, whereby one
rules out all legitimate bases for existing racial disparities and is left with racial biasunconscious or conscious-as the only likely explanation. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, TheDiscriminating Mind:Define It, Prove It, 40 CoNN. L. Rv. 979, 986 (2008) ("Because people rarely admit to taking race into account, conscious discrimination is often covert or hidden from view.
Proving discrimination therefore comes down to a process of elimination. The key is to rule
out other explanations.").

244 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(b) (2006).
245 See Washington. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
246
247

See Foster, supranote 7, at 1472.
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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either eliminating or establishing pretext surrounding the challenged
practice.248 Whether the justifications for a challenged electoral practice
are tenuous helps to establish pretext for and supports an inference of
discrimnination-including unintentional discrinmination-sufficient to
establish that the disparate impact has occurred on account of race. The
Senate Report's framing of the evaluation of the state's justification supports this construction of Section 2.249 By employing the term "tenuousness," which by definition refers to "fliis[iness]," "weak[ness]," or
"having little substance," 25 0 the Senate directed courts' analysis toward
determining whether the policy underlying the challenged practice is
suspect. In so doing, the Senate indicated an interest in revealing pretext and bias, rather than determining the legitimacy of the practice for

its own sake. A policy that is tenuous is thus treated as suspect within the
totality of the circumstances analysis under Section 2.
Interpreting the tenuousness factor too broadly inevitably skews
the analysis of the challenged practice. A rational and legitimate policy
supporting a state action, in contrast to an action that is arbitrary and
irrational, may be presumed to be free of bias. Section 2, however, does
not compel that inquiry. Instead, courts are asked to evaluate whether
there is evidence of tenuousness, not whether there is evidence of legitimacy. The state's legitimate interest in maintaining a challenged
policy cannot override a racially disparate impact, as evidenced by the
existence or extent of one or more Senate factors.251 Indeed, the purpose of Section 2 is to root out racial discrimnination-by intent or effect-in the electoral process; it is not to permit such discrimination so
long as the state has a good non-racial reason for the policy.252
248 See

S. REP. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982), repTinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205.
Id. ("[W]hether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such
voting qualification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous.").
250 MERRIAM-WEBSTER COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1211 (9th ed. 1991).
251 One way to improve the inverse relation test-and to ensure against this resultwould be to require that tenuousness bear an inverse relationship not only to disparate
impact, but also to the evidence of external discrimination. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. Expanding the inverse relation test to include external discrimination brings
us closer to the robust totality of the circumstances test that Section 2 requires, and isolates
the factors that are likely to be most relevant in a disparate vote denial case. Nevertheless,
the danger in isolating and weighting any single factor or subset of factors in the totality of
the circumstances remains.
252 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (2006) (stating that a violation of Section 2 exists if "it is shown
that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a)"). This raises a fundamental proof question: can absence of a Senate factor be a
defense? Because the Senate factors are a non-exhaustive list of relevant considerations and
the U.S. Supreme Court has made clear that no one factor makes or breaks a claim, permit249
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Moreover, to the extent that the state burdens the right to vote beyond what is necessary to achieve the race-neutral policy goal, the policy is tenuous. 253 This interpretation of the tenuousness factor is consistent with the framing of the other Senate factors. Each of the factors
directs courts to determine the role of race in a challenged practice
based on direct or circumstantial evidence. 254 For example, the factors
examining "[t]he extent of any history of official discrimination," 255
"[t]he extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized," 256 "[t]he extent to which the state or
political subdivision has used unusually large election districts . . . that

may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority
group,"25 7 and "[w]hether political campaigns have been characterized
by overt or subtle racial appeals"25 8 (factors one, two, three, and six,
respectively) permit the court to infer that a disparate impact occurred
on account of race based on the existence and extent of one or more
factors. The casual context test would also permit plaintiffs to establish
tenuousness by examining whether government actors have minimized
the racial impact of an electoral practice.
The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC)
administrative guidance for age discrimination claims is instructive on
this point. 259 In response to the Supreme Court's shifting standard from
ting the absence of Senate factors to establish a defense would undermine the totality of the
circumstances principle. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45. Instead, courts are to weigh the presence,
absence, strength, and weakness of individual factors in the totality of the circumstances
analysis to determine whether the disparate impact that the challenged practice causes is on
account of race. See supranote 71 and accompanying text.
253 See Marc Mauer, Racial Impact Statements as a Means of Reducing Unwarranted Sentencing
Disparities, 5 Ono ST. J. CRIM. L. 19, 19 (2007) (arguing that requiring racial impact statements prior to enacting law enforcement regulations "would enable legislators and the public
to anticipate any unwarranted racial disparities and to consider alternative policies that could
accomplish the goals of the legislation without causing undue racial effects").
254 S. RiP. No. 97-417, at 28 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 269.
255 Id. at 29.
256 Id.
257 Id (emphasis added).
258 Id.
259 EEOC Questions & Answers, supra note 35. Recent election law scholarship has acknowledged the potentially transformative role of administrative law and agencies in the
future enforcement of voting rights and election administration. See, e.g., Pildes, supra note
160, at 17, 26. The EEOC's role in preserving and defining a relevant space for disparate
impact claims in the employment context is a worthy example of how institutions and agencies can balance and even temper the judicial response to such claims. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4(D) (2012) (EEOC Title VII regulation) (defining criteria for a showing of disparate
impact). For example, the EEOC has issued guidance on what determines whether an employment practice is based on RFOA-the lesser standard that supplanted business necessity.
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business necessity to the less potent "reasonable factors other than age"
(RFOA) standard in age discrimination suits, 26 0 the EEOC offered the
following guidance concerning the evidentiary support for such claims:
If a police department decided to require applicants for patrol
positions to pass a physical fitness test to be sure that the officers were physically able to pursue and apprehend suspects, it
should know that such a test might exclude older workers
more than younger ones. Nevertheless, the department's actions would likely be based on an RFOA if it reasonably believed that the test measured the speed and strength appropriate to the job, and if it did not know, or should not have
known, of steps that it could have taken to reduce harm to
older workers without unduly burdening the department. 261
These guidelines can be distilled into what I term the "ARC" analysis:
(1) awareness of the law's impact; (2) reasonable belief in its necessity;
and (3) cognizable harm reduction and balancing. The EEOC guidelines further instruct that "[tihe rule emphasizes the need for an individualized consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding
the particular situation."262
See EEOC Questions & Answers, supra note 35. The factors are instructive to the VRA analysis:
"An employment practice is based on an RFOA when it was reasonably designed and administered to achieve a legitimate business purpose in light of the circumstances, including its
potential harm to older workers." Id. The electoral arena, however, has yet to have the benefit
of an administrative agency with the authority, consistency, and relevance of the EEOC.
260 See Smith v. City ofJackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 239 (2005).
261 EEOC Questions & Answers, supra note 35.
262 Id. Considerations relevant to assessing reasonableness include the following:
(i)
(ii)

(iii)

(iv)
(v)

The extent to which the factor is related to the employer's stated business purpose;
The extent to which the employer defined the factor accurately and
applied the factor fairly and accurately, including the extent to which
managers and supervisors were given guidance or training about how
to apply the factor and avoid discrimination;
The extent to which the employer limited supervisors' discretion to assess employees subjectively, particularly where the criteria that the supervisors were asked to evaluate are known to be subject to negative
age-based stereotypes;
The extent to which the employer assessed the adverse impact of its
employment practice on older workers; and
The degree of the harm to individuals within the protected age group,
in terms of both the extent of injury and the numbers of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the employer took steps to
reduce the harm, in light of the burden of undertaking such steps.

29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(c) (2) (emphasis added).
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Repurposed for vote denial claims, the EEOC's RFOA standard
can be transformed to reasonable factors other than race ("RFOR"). In
particular, RFOR could be used to determine the tenuousness of the
state policy (Senate factor five), or, in other words, the reasonableness
of the state's belief in the need for the electoral law or practice. Accordingly, RFOR for vote denial claims would evaluate:
* The extent to which the factor-for example, voter ID, felon
status, or consistent registration data-is related to the state's
stated election administration purpose;
* The extent to which the state defined the factor accurately and
applied the factor fairly and accurately, including the extent to
which election officials and other state actors were given guidance
or training about how to apply the factor and avoid discrimination;
* The extent to which the state limited election officials' discretion
to assess voters subjectively, particularly where the criteria that the
state actors were asked to evaluate are known to be subject to negative race-based stereotypes;
* The extent to which the state assessed the adverse impact of its
election law on racial minorities; and
* The degree of the harm to individuals within the minority group,
in terms of both the extent of injury and the numbers of persons
adversely affected, and the extent to which the state took steps to
reduce the harm, in light of the burden of undertaking such
steps.263

These factors would incentivize states to take specific actions to avoid
potential liability. First, the state must become aware of the law's impact. It would no longer be sufficient to enact a law affecting elections
without assessing the impact of the potential vote abridgement it may
cause. Second, there must be a substantial threat to the integrity of
elections to make the state's belief in the necessity of the electoral law
reasonable. The bulleted factors above help guide an analysis of reasonableness. Third, there must be an identifiable harm of which the
state was not, and should not have been, aware, that could be addressed
without burdening the right to vote to such an extent.
Unlike the prerequisites and burden-shifting test, however, the
plaintiff would bear the affirmative burden of establishing tenuousness
by using the ARC principles or other proof. In applying the ARC prin263 See EEOC Questions & Answers, supra note 35. These RFOR factors are adapted from
the EEOC's guidelines regarding RFOA.
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ciples, the causal context test permits a discomfiting recounting of the
effects of systemic and vestigial racism on the quotidian existence of
racial minorities and their electoral participation. Indeed, this is the
causal context at its core. The overarching narrative traces the impact
of racial inequality within and outside of the electoral arena on the
electoral participation of minorities. Section 2 jurisprudence, the VRA's
congressional record, and the plain text of Section 2 provide helpful
guideposts toward the key elements of a successful narrative. Thus,
framed in the narrative of causal context, Section 2's totality of the circunstances test is flexible enough to account for historical context and
adapt to shifting conceptions of racial discrimination while fending off
constitutional attack.

III. APPLYING THE CAUSAL CONTEXT TEST TO MODERN VOTE DENIAL
A workable disparate vote denial test requires certain fixed and
definable elements. First, there must be vote denial or other infringement on the right to vote. In the case of voter ID, restrictive voting periods, felon disfranchisement, and other practices resulting in modern
vote denial, this threshold requirement is easy to satisfy by direct reference to the challenged statute that denies or burdens the right to vote
based on a particular act or classification-for example, failure to produce valid identification, felon status, or, in the case of voter purges,
incorrect or inconsistent registration information. 264 In voter ID cases,

this threshold could be met with proof that certain voters are unable to
meet or are disproportionately burdened by the voter ID requirements,
and are, therefore, more likely to be unable to cast a ballot on Election
Day. Second, plaintiffs must prove that the denial or burden is on account of race. Indeed, the disparate impact itself offers some potential
proof of a race-based voting burden. 265 When coupled with evidence of
how the race-neutral law interacts with external social conditions, the
tenuousness of the policy (including the ARC principles), and the surrounding electoral context, the disparate impact will become either
more or less explicable in terms of race.26 6
In lieu of burden shifting, plaintiffs bear responsibility for the affirmative case in its entirety.2 67 Plaintiffs may utilize all Senate factors at
264 See supra notes 103-125 and accompanying text.
265See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
266See supra notes 248-263 and accompanying text.
267 To be sure, the prerequisites and burden-shifting test predates the U.S. Supreme
Court's 2009 decision in Ricci v. DeStefano, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's 2010 decision in Farrakhanv. Gregoire (FarrakhanIV), which bear upon what a legally
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their disposal to place the disparate impact in a broader context-the
causal context.268 At bottom, it is enough to use circumstantial evidence
to eliminate race-neutral causes for disparate vote denial from the
range of possible explanations. Here, "race neutral" should be understood in its most literal sense: if a law is neutral as to race, then the race
of the voter should not be predictive of the likelihood that he or she
will experience vote denial. This is not a back-end means of proving a
Section 2 claim solely by statistical disparities; rather, it forces the trier
of fact to consider the vote denial claim in the absence of proof of intent as the 1982 VRA amendments require.26 9 The fact that race plays a
determining role in who gets to vote and who does not is sufficient to
satisfy Section 2. This vigilance in preventing the insertion of race into

the electoral sphere is consistent with the intent and purpose of the
VRA.270

No matter the formulation of the test, however, the crucial question of its constitutionality remains. The constitutionality of the VRA
has been the subject of a steady stream of legal challenges since its inception and has been successfully affirmed each tine. 271 Indeed, as is
often cited in its defense, the VRA is an exemplar of congressional
power at its zenith.2 72 Nevertheless, the scope of Congress's authority is

viable test for new vote denial claims-especially felon disfranchisement claims-would be.
See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 593 (2009); Farrakhan v. Gregoire (FarrakhanIV), 590
E3d 989, 1004 (9th Cir.), aff'd in part, overruled in part en banc, 623 E3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010)
(FarrakhanV); supra notes 185-196 and accompanying text (explaining the "prerequisites
and burden-shifting" test).
268This approach is also consistent with vote dilution claims. Indeed, even the prerequisites established by the Supreme Court in Thornburg v. Gingles do not create a burdenshifting mechanism, and leave the onus on plaintiffs to affirmatively prove disparate impact. Thornburg . Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 (1986).
269See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
270See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
"1 See, e.g., City of Rome . United States, 446 U.S. 156, 173 (1980); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966). The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia
has upheld the constitutionality of Section 5 of the VRA twice since it was reauthorized in
2006. See LaRoque v. Holder, 831 F. Supp. 2d 183, 238 (D.D.C. 2011); Shelby Cnty., Ala. v.
Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 508 (D.D.C. 2011) (upholding Section 5's "preclearance"
provision in a challenge by the city of Calera, Alabama, which enacted a discriminatory
redistricting plan without seeking preclearance, resulting in a loss by the city's only African
American councilman), aff'd, 679 F.3d 848, 884 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3064
(U.S. Nov. 9, 2012) (No. 12-96).
272 See South Carolina, 383 U.S. at 309 (noting that the unique historical period of the
VRA's enactment justifies the Act's expansive powers); Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and
Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE L.J. 174, 177 (2007) (explaining that Congress
"acted at the apex of its power to enforce the guarantees of the post-Civil War Amendments" when it enacted the VRA).
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tinder scrutiny in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's 1997 decision in
City of Boerne v. Flores273 and other cases. Moreover, a different Court in
a different socio-historical moment is vetting current challenges to the
VRA's constitutionality. 274 Accordingly, the Court's continued recognition of the VRA's constitutionality is hardly a foregone conclusion. 275
The arguments supporting and challenging the VRA's constitutionality have been thoughtfully laid out in an array of scholarship and
are not repeated here. 276 Instead, I focus on certain factors unique to

273 See 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding that remedial legislation can prohibit conduct that does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, but "[t]here must be a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end"); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 533-34 (2004) (holding
that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act is valid under the Fourteenth Amendment); Net. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738-39 (2003) (holding that
Congress acted within its authority under the Fourteenth Amendment in abrogating the
states' immunity under the Family and Medical Leave Act). To the extent that the VRA is
primarily Fifteenth Amendment remedial legislation, City of Boerne's congruence and proportionality test does not apply.
274 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer; Is This the Beginning of the End of the Second Reconstruction?,
Fiv. LAW., June 2012, at 54, 58 ("The country's constitutional culture is clearly different today than it was at the time the Court decided [Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 631 (1966)].
The Court is far more assertive and muscular than it used to be, and the political question
doctrine seems to be largely a relic of our constitutional past.").
275 See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 848, 884 (D.C. Cir.) (holding that
Congress did not exceed its powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in authorizing the
preclearance requirement of the VRA), cert. granted, 81 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. No. 9, 2012)
(No. 12-96); Texas . Holder, No. 12-cy-128, 2012 WL 3743676, at *4 (D.D.C. Aug. 30,
2012) (considering the plaintiff's argument that Section 5 of the VRA "exceeds the enumerated powers of Congress and conflicts with Article IV of the Constitution and the
Tenth Amendment"); see also Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One . Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 20405 (2009) (upholding Section 5 under a congruence and proportionality standard).
276 See, e.g., Ansolabehere et al., supra note 223, at 1388; Warren M. Christopher, The
Constitutionalityof the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 S IAN. L. Rrv. 1, 15 (1965); Luis FuentesRohwer, Understandingthe ParadoxicalCase of the Voting Rights Act, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 697,
701 (2009); Michael Halberstam, The Myth of "Conquered Provinces": Probingthe Extent of the
WRA's Encroachment on State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923, 927 (2011); Richard
L. Hasen, CongressionalPower to Renew the PreclearanceProvisions of the Voting Rights Act After
Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHIo ST. L.J. 177, 178-81 (2005); Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5
Squared: CongressionalPower to Extend and Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 Hous. L. Rrv. 1, 34 (2007); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies
After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. Riv. 725, 731-41 (1998); Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation: Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist
and Waite Courts, 101 Micii. L. REv. 2341, 2361 (2003); Luke P. McLoughlin, Section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, and Trajectory of Vote-Dilution
Standards, 31 Vi. L. Riv. 39, 47-48 (2006); Michael J. Pitts, CongressionalEnforcement of Affirmative Democracy Through Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 185, 187-88
(2005);Jennifer G. Presto, The 1982 Amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act: Constitutionality After City of Boerne, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRV. AM. L. 609, 614 (2004); Franita Tolson,
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Section 2 and the causal context test that insulate it from constitutional
challenge. In particular, Section 2 brings external discrimination into
the remedial ambit of election law.277 In turn, this produces outcomes
that are seemingly incongruent as a normative matter-the identification of racial harm without a legal remedy for that harim-and yet perfectly congruent as a legal one. This juxtaposition illuminates a sensible
limit of the VRA's remedial power and Section 2's constitutional prowess. Indeed, the limits imposed on remedies available under Section 2
underscore its genius.
Section 2 remedies do not necessarily impose a permanent ban on
the challenged electoral practice. 278 Instead, Section 2 discontinues the
use of an otherwise lawful electoral practice so long as it continues to
result in vote denial or dilution on account of race. If the causal context of race discrimination is eliminated, then the practice, presumably,
would be valid. In the context of felon disfranchisement laws, for example, if rates of conviction begin to approximate rates of criminal activity across all racial groups, then felon disfranchisement provisions
would not be challengeable under Section 2-absent evidence of intentional discrinination-even if a disparate impact on voting rights occurred. Under established Section 2 jurisprudence, if in fact blacks
commit crimes at a higher rate than whites, and are therefore convicted
of crimes at a correspondingly higher rate, resulting in a loss of voting
rights at a correspondingly higher rate, then the practice would presuiptively be valid under Section 2 despite its disparate impact. Consequently, no Section 2 claim could be established.
There is indeed a peculiarity in challenging the symptom of discriminatory vote denial resulting from the problem of racial discrinination in society, while leaving the problem ostensibly unreimediated. This
outcome is a function of the surgical nature of the VRA's remedies,
which consequently preserves the VRA's constitutionality. For example,
in the case of felon disfranchiseinent, discrimination in the criminal
justice system that is not legally cognizable under the Supreme Court's
1987 decision in McCleskey v. Kemp can nonetheless form the basis of a

Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on theI Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REv.
1195, 1202 (2012).
277 See S. RiP. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982), repuinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205.
278 Although Section 2 itself is a "permanent" provision of the VRA, a Section 2 violation is unlike a violation of the VRA's other provisions in that it may be cured by the passage of time. See 42 I.S.C. §§ 1973aa, 1973b(b) (2006) (implementing a permanent, nationwide ban on literacy tests).
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disparate impact claim under the causal context analysis.279 This seemingly incongruent result is consistent with the VRA's mandate to prevent racial discrimination-either purposeful or by effect-from conpromising the integrity of our democracy. Section 2's constitutionality is
preserved because discrimination external to the electoral process that
informs a disparate vote denial claim is not actionable under the VRA.
That is, the VRA's narrow but penetrating purpose of protecting elections from the effects of external discrimination and not prosecuting
that discrimination directly distances the VRA from the constitutional
concerns that surround other disparate impact claims.2s0
The presumption of discrimination that Section 2 establishes satisfies congruence and proportionality for several reasons. The remedy

sought in Section 2 vote denial challenges is in effect only temporary.
Conditions external to the process of voting that presumably can be
corrected provide the rationale for the remedy, and the remedy is no
longer appropriate once those conditions cease to create a disparate
impact. The remedy is not a referendum on the policy and practice of
voter ID, early voting, felon disfranchisement, voter purges, or similar
modern vote denial practices; rather, it is a referendum on the racially
disparate results that these laws produce in the electoral arena and the
consequent effect on democracy. Because of the power of the vote in
our democracy-because the right to vote secures all others 28 1- Congress has determined that discrimination may not infect voting or limit
it on account of race, even if such discrimination is not purposeful.
As a practical matter, how can the causal context test be used to
combat modern vote denial practices that threaten to roll back the historic minority voter registration of the 2008 and 2012 elections, as well
as the history of progress and transformation that is the VRA's ongoing
legacy? In the following Sections, I take three persistent threats to robust minority voter participation-voter ID, felon disfranchisement,
and voter purges-and outline briefly how the causal context test
would apply to each.

279 See McCleskeyxv. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 291 (1987); supra notes 126-135 and accompanying text.
280 See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Future of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the Hands of
a Conservative Court, 5 DUKE j. CONST. L. & POL'Y 125, 142 (2010) (arguing that the political ideologies of Supreme Court justices, and, more importantly, their proclivity toward
policy making, are likely to play a consequential role in determining the VRA's constitutionality).
281 See Yick Wo . Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (noting that "the political franchise of voting" is a "fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights").
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A. Voter ID
Since 2008, state governments across the country have enacted a
plethora of laws that encumber the right to vote. Of the array of voting
barriers, including decreased opportunities for early voting,2S 2 retrenchment from reforms aimed at enfranchising citizens with felony
convictions, 2 83 and more stringent voter registration regulations, 284
voter ID laws stand out as among the most suspicious. Like most of these
new voting restrictions, voter ID laws disproportionately burden the voting rights of young, minority, and low-income voters, as well as persons
with disabilities. 285 Nationally, twenty-five percent of black voting-age
citizens, as compared to only nine percent of white voting-age citizens,
lack a government-issued photo identification.286 Although many causes
factor into this disparity, a disproportionate lack of a driver's license,
high residential mobility, and lack of access to necessary documentation
play significant roles.287
As discussed above, many recent challenges to voter ID laws have
been brought under Section 5 of the VRA. 288 This is due to the Supreme Court's 2008 holding in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board
that a legitimate state interest in preventing voter fraud, modernizing
elections, and safeguarding voter confidence outweighs the burden
placed on voters to produce voter IDs to exercise their right to vote.2S 9

282 See WEISER & NORDEN, supra note 2, at 29-33 (reporting that nine states have introduced bills to reduce their early voting periods, and that Florida, Georgia, and Ohio have
cut their early voting periods in half).
283 See id. at 34-36; see also NAACP, DEFENDING DEMOCRACY, Supta note 111, at 26 (explaining that there are now four states that permanently deprive individuals of the right to
vote after they have been convicted of a felony); id. at 12, 25-27 (explaining that these
restrictions will have a disproportionate burden on minorities because African Americans
and Latinos suffer disproportionate rates of criminal conviction).
284 See ROGOWSKI & COHEN, Supra note 2, at 2-3; WEISER & NORDEN, Supra note 2, at

19-28.
285 At least one report estimated that these new laws "could make it significantly harder
for more than five million eligible voters to cast ballots in 2012." WEISER & NORDEN, Supra
note 2, at 1 (analyzing nineteen laws and two executive actions that passed in fourteen
states).
286 See ROGOWSKI & COHEN, supra note 2, at 4.
287 Id. at 2.
288 See supra notes 103-125 and accompanying text.
289 See 553 U.S. 181, 191-200 (2008). Justice John Paul Stevens provided the following
reasoning in his opinion for the 6-3 majority:

[T]he photo identification cards issued by Indiana's BMV are ... free. For
most voters who need them, the inconvenience of making a trip to the BMV,
gathering the required documents, and posing for a photograph surely does
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The causal context test allows Section 2 to potentially address voter ID
laws by permitting plaintiffs to prove that there is a broader context of
inequality that creates the disparity in possession of certain forms of
voter ID. For example, implicit bias surrounding voter ID laws might be
inferred from the demographics of the states that have sought to impose such laws, the likely effect that those laws will have on minority
communities in those states, and the impact that such laws will have on
the ability of minority voters to elect the candidate of their choice. 290
Moreover, the lack of evidence of voter fraud to justify the imposition of
the laws in light of the disparate impact that results could prove Senate
factor five, the tenuousness of the state policy. 291 The ARC principles
would call into question the state's awareness of the impact of the voter

ID laws (1) whether there is a reasonable belief that the laws are necessary to achieve a legitimate election administration goal, and (2)
whether there is another way of achieving the state's goal that would
reduce the potential harm to minority voters. 292 Enforcing these principles would significantly retard the proliferating efforts to impose
voter ID laws absent any state justification based on evidence of fraud.

not qualify as a substantial burden on the right to vote, or even represent a
significant increase over the usual burdens of voting.
Both evidence in the record and facts of which we may take judicial notice,
however, indicate that a somewhat heavier burden may be placed on a limited
number of persons. They include elderly persons born out of state, who may
have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate[, etc.] ....
The severity of that burden is, of course, mitigated by the fact that, if eligible, voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will
ultimately be counted. To do so, however, they must travel to the circuit court
clerk's office within 10 days to execute the required affidavit. It is unlikely
that such a requirement would pose a constitutional problem unless it is
wholly unjustified. And even assuming that the burden may not be justified as
to a few voters, that conclusion is by no means sufficient to establish petitioners' right to the relief they seek in this litigation.
Id. at 198-200 (footnotes omitted). Notably, in Pennsylvania, plaintiffs were successful in
bringing a non-VRA challenge that resulted in a court postponing the implementation of
voter ID laws until after the upcoming general election. Applewhite . Pennsylvania, No.
330 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 4497211, at *8 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. Oct. 2, 2012).
290 See, e.g., Sonne v. Bd. of Trs. of Suffern, 887 N.YS.2d 145, 155 (App. Div. 2009)
(recognizing the plaintiff's argument for disparate treatment because the village building
code was selectively enforced in violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights).
291 See S. Rrp. No. 97-417, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 205.
292 See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
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B. Felon Disfranchisement
The underlying theory prenising felon disfranchisement challenges under Section 2 is that the effects of discrimination in the
criminal justice system are replicated in the electoral process because of
laws that deny or abridge the right of persons convicted of a felony to
vote. 293 These challenges sharply demonstrate how the Senate factors
can be used to reveal racial discrimination in various contexts external
to elections, such as the criminal justice system, in order to sustain a
remedy under the VRA. The expanding number of such challenges in
the past decade is a testament to the broad impact of felon disfranchisement laws on communities of color throughout the United States.
Putting aside the question of whether Section 2 can reach felon
disfranchisement laws, 29 4 felon disfranchisement cases raise difficult
293 Most courts entertaining challenges to felon disfranchisement laws have been hostile to such claims. Namely, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, and Eleventh
Circuits have held that the VRA does not apply to felon disfranchisement laws. See, e.g.,
Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 42 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that the VRA does not apply to
Massachusetts's felon disfranchisement laws); Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 329 (2d Cir.
2006) (en banc) (holding that the VRA does not apply to New York's felon disfranchisement laws); Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 405 F.3d 1214, 1234 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding
that the VRA does not apply to Florida's felon disfranchisement laws). Another group of
federal appellate courts have assumed, without holding, that the VRA applies, but have
held that there was no sufficient nexus between the challenged vote denial and the alleged
racial effects. See Howard v. Gilmore, No. 99-2285, 2000 WL 203984, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23,
2000) (assuming without deciding that the VRA applies to Virginia's laws, but holding that
there was no Section 2 violation); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262 (6th Cir. 1986)
(assuming without deciding that the VRA applies to Tennessee's laws, but holding that
there was no Section 2 violation). The one federal appellate court that initially determined
that there was a Section 2 violation later reversed itself en banc. See FarrakhanV 623 F.3d at
993-94 (reversing a panel opinion that held that the discrimination in Washington's
criminal justice system so infected the electoral process through its otherwise legitimate
felon disfranchisement laws that those laws violated the VRA).
294 For reasons deserving more attention than is devoted here, I believe that felon disfranchisement statutes fall squarely within the ambit of Section 2. To suggest otherwise
would mean that an intentionally racially discriminatory statute denying persons convicted
of felonies the right to vote could not be brought under Section 2. See Farrakhan v. Washington (Farrakhan III), 359 F.3d 1116, 1121-24 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc) ("Intentional discrimination in the criminal justice
system, if it interacts with a standard, practice or procedure with respect to voting, could
amount to illegal vote denial on account of race.") (citing Johnson v. Governor of Fla., 353
F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003), vacated en banc, 337 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2004)). The absurdity
of this result makes finding that Section 2 applies equally to felon disfranchisement statutes that are not intended to discriminate on account of race but, nonetheless, have the
effect of doing so more comprehensible as a textual matter. In addition, these laws may be
constitutionally vulnerable on other grounds. See generally Nelson, supra note 170 (examining the constitutionality of felon disenfranchisement with respect to the First Amendment
and the Equal Protection Clause); David Zetlin-Jones, Note, Right to Remain Silent?: What the
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questions regarding how to prove discrimination through evidence of
disparate impact as a touchstone rather than as the sole evidentiary
support. A separate but related implication of felon disfranchisement
challenges is that they are an indirect "adjudication" of racial discrimination within the criminal justice system and in other non-electoral
contexts. In other words, the Senate factors allow for a showing of discrinination that may or may not give rise to an independent cause of
action to remedy that discrimination. Like voter ID challenges, felon
disfranchisement cases require courts to determine that there is societal discrimination in the criminal justice system, and provide a remedy
that has no direct relation to correcting that discrimination.
In the 2010 case, FarrakhanIV the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit utilized a test much like the causal context test outlined
here. 295 In later denying the plaintiffs' Section 2 claim, the en banc
court held that the plaintiffs had failed to proffer evidence of a "causal
connection" between the compelling evidence of discrimination in
Washington's criminal justice system and the racially disparate vote denial that the state's felon disfranchisement statutes effect.29 6 For example, in addition to proof of substantial disparate impact, the plaintiffs
proffered uncontroverted evidence of statistical disparities at every
stage of the criminal justice system, as well as a qualitative assessment of
the data by sociology and law enforcement experts, who opined that
the outcomes of the criminal justice system resulted from practices that
could not be explained in race-neutral terms. 297 Put another way, the
experts testified that the statistical disparities were produced on account of race. 298 Controlling for rates of criminal activity, blacks are
convicted of crimes at rates disproportionately higher than whites. 299
Assuming that the goal of law enforcement is to identify and prosecute
perpetrators of illegal activity, the racial demographics of those prosecuted should approximate those of the perpetrators absent some valid,
race-neutral explanation for the disparity. Here, the uncontroverted
evidence showed that racial groups are not represented among the
population of convicted felons in rates that reflect their criminal activ-

Voting Rights Act Can and Should Say About Felony Disenfranchisement, 47 B.C. L. REv. 411
(2006) (assessing the shortcomings of challenges to felony disenfranchisement statutes
under the VRA and proposing constitutional alternatives).
295
See 590 E3d at 1005.
296FarrakhanV, 623 E3d at 993-94.
297Farrakhan I1' 590 E3d at 1012-13.
298 Id.
299 Id.
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ity.300 That is the statistical disparity. The evidence also showed, however, that apparent race-neutral explanations for the disparity were not
credible.3 o This significant disparity, coupled with the absence of a
race-neutral policy that explains the disparity, supports a conclusion of
discrimination in the criminal justice systein.30 2
The plaintiffs in FarrakhanIVoffered uncontroverted proof of the
disparate impact of Washington's felon disfranchisement laws on minority voters and of racial disparities at every point of contact with the
state's criminal justice system.s303 The majority acknowledged this evidence of disparate impact without ascribing a specific value to it or
categorizing it as a prerequisite factor in a balancing test. 304 Rather, the
panel majority set out to discern whether the disparate impact was cre-

ated in part because of discrimination external to voting, and held that,
indeed, it was.305 Specifically, the court relied on expert analyses of the
disparity to conclude that the disparity could not be explained in raceneutral terins. 3so
Despite the controversial policy rationales underlying felon disfranchiseient laws and the challenges to them, these statutes provide a
useful lens through which to examine the hill reach and application of
Section 2 of the VRA in vote denial claims. The presumed constitutionality of the practice of felon disfranchisement 30 7 should not thwart the
opportunity to better understand congressional power, the largesse of
the VRA as an antidiscrimination tool, and the state of disparate impact
jurisprudence.

o Id.
301 Id.

so2 See id. In Wesley v. Collins,

[t]he court of appeals did not specifically affirm, or even mention, the trial
court's holding that "while intent need not be shown [under Section 21, the
ultimate conclusion that a violation has occurred must be tied to a finding
that the scheme unfairly impacts on the minority group-not necessarily
purposefully, but at leastfor reasons deemed more culpable than neutral."
Pershing, supra note 180, at 1191 (emphasis added) (quoting Wesley v. Collins, 605 E Supp.
802, 810 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), affd, 791 E2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986)).
sos FarrakhanIV 590 F.3d at 1012-13.
304 Id.
so1Id. at 1014.
3o Id.
307

See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
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C. Voter Purges
In the months leading up to the 2012 general election, some states
purged their rolls of registered voters in ways that alarmed interest
groups and triggered allegations of voter suppression.SOS Florida, whose
voter purge preceding the 2000 elections became the subject of postelection lawsuits,3 09 pursued a controversial voter purge that the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and many civil rights groups opposed in
advance of the 2012 general elections. Like many recent claims of voter
fraud, those that the State of Florida articulated were de minimis in

number-particularly so when compared to the number of false purges
and the amount of proven fraud among Florida's eleven million-plus
registered voters.slo Florida justified the purges as based on an alleged
need to remove noncitizens from its voter registration rolls to ensure
the integrity of its absentee ballot process.3 11 Of the ninety-five cases
brought by the DOJ's Ballot Access and Voting Integrity Initiative between October 2002 and September 2005, however, "none of the
crimes prosecuted in this period could possibly have been prevented by
requiring photo identification at the polls." 312 Under the causal context
analysis, the unfounded perception of certain Florida elected officials
that the voting rolls contained a significant number of noncitizens
could be evidence of implicit (or even explicit) bias. As with voter ID
challenges, plaintiffs challenging similar purges under the causal context analysis would be able to proffer evidence of disparate impact and
evidence supporting the Senate factors, including evidence of the
tenuousness of the State's policy. For example, the ARC analysis allows
plaintiffs to show that the disparate impact is caused by reasonable factors other than race.

308 See NAACP, DEFENDING DEMOCRACY, supra note 111, at 28-29 (describing examples
of voter purging in Florida and Mississippi).
309 See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint at 2, 14-15, NAACP v. Harris, No. 01-0120
(S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2002), 2002 WL 32961275.
310 See NAACP, DEP ENDING DEMoCRACY, supra note 111, at 28-29. A news account suggested that among those purged from Florida's voter rolls were over ninety World War II
veterans. See Robbie Brown, Florida's Approach to Purging Voter Rolls of Noncitizens Prompts

FederalLawsuit, N.Y. TimEs,June 13, 2012, at A7.
311 See NAACP, DEFENDING DEMOCRACY, supra note 111, at 29.
312

JUSIIN LEVIIT, BRENNAN CIR. ORjustiicr,THE TRUTH ABOuIIVOTER FRAA) 41-42

n.146 (2007), availableat http://brennan.3cdn.net/c176576cOO65a7eb84_gxm6ibOhl.pdf.
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CONCLUSION
The VRA is not a panacea for all that ails our democracy. Rather,
through expansive provisions like Section 2, the VRA answers a discrete
and compelling question in our multiethnic, multiracial political system: how can law protect the electoral process from racial inequality?
By taking account of the contextual factors that cause disparate vote
denial, Section 2 challenges to modern voting practices such as voter
ID requirements, felon disfranchisement, and voter purges can reveal
areas where racial discrimination has infected the electoral sphere, and
thus preserve the integrity of the democratic enterprise. The causal
context test is an effort to realign Section 2 jurisprudence with the provision's "core values," to consider racial context as a cause of disparate
vote denial, and to recognize implicit bias as evidence of discrimination
within and outside the electoral arena. Indeed, Section 2 provides
heightened protection in the electoral arena, even when the underlying discrimination that results in vote denial is not legally cognizable.
This paradox is a byproduct of the VRA's overarching purpose to ensure an inclusive democracy where race does not determine participation, while confining its reach to the electoral arena.
The narrowing construct of race discrimination claims outside the
electoral arena ignores substantial racial disparities resulting from state
action on the premise that discrimination occurs, and is thus actionable, only when it is intentional or explicit. Accepting contextual evidence of racial discrimination, including implicit bias, is a more accurate, middle-ground approach that recognizes societal discrimination
without ascribing blame or intent. As our democracy ains to transcend
its discriminatory past, the causal context analysis thoughtfully navigates its nuanced, race-conscious present toward a stronger, more honest democratic vision.

